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• This	is	the	first	study	to	evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	the	JKN	programme	using	IFLS	data.			This	thesis	is	organised	into	10	chapters:		1) Chapter	2	provides	an	overview	of	basic	health	insurance	theories,	then	proceeds	to	discuss	it	into	health	financing	system	in	LMICs	with	specific	reference	to	the	context	in	Indonesia.		2) Chapter	3	presents	the	background	information	of	Indonesia	followed	by	the	history	of	the	health	insurance	programme	before	and	after	the	1998	economic	crisis,	and	the	detail	of	the	JKN	programme.		3) Chapters	4	and	5	present	a	systematic	review	of	the	effect	of	health	insurance	in	LMICs	in	terms	of	access	to	care,	financial	protection	and	health	status.	In	chapter	4,	I	provide	an	overview	of	the	systematic	review	and	identify	the	review	which	has	the	best	quality	among	the	selected	reviews.	The	search	strategy	of	the	chosen	best	review	is	updated	to	include	more	recent	evidence	and	its	findings	are	presented	in	chapter	5.		
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Prepayment	premium	 Voluntary	 Yes	 Contributing	members	(and	their	dependents	
Private	
insurance	









































































































































































































































































































































Districts: Kabupaten/Regency (Regent) 
or Kota/City (Mayor)
Kecamatan/sub-district (Head of sub-district)









Public hospitals type A and B
District health offices
Public hospitals type C and D
Puskesmas












Facilities	 Number	(Year)	 Coverage	 Services	Puskesmas	 9,671	(2014)	 30,000	–	150,000	 Basic	health	care	services,	child	and	maternal	care,	family	planning,	sanitation,	health	prevention	and	promotion		Pustu	 23,875	(2013)	 2,500	–	10,000	 An	extension	of	Puskesmas	to	reach	villages,	but	with	more	limited	facilities	Posyandu	 280,225	(2013)	 50	children	under	5-years	of	age	and	their	mothers	 Family	planning,	maternal	care,	child	nutrition	(e.g.	growth	monitoring,	supplemental	feeding),	immunisation	Pusling	 8,009	(Four-wheels)	958	(Boats)	(2013)	
Access	to	more	remote	areas;	Either	by	four-wheel	vehicle	or	boat	
Basic	health	care	services,	immunisation,	family	planning	
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Province	 Ratio	of	hospital	bed	 Adjusted	ratio	of	hospital	bed	 Density	of	Physician	 Adjusted	Density	of	Physician	Aceh	 	1.12		 	0.37		 	0.31		 	0.10		North	Sumatera	 	1.36		 	0.36		 	0.23		 	0.06		West	Sumatera	 	1.08		 	0.49		 	0.34		 	0.16		Riau	 	0.83		 	0.18		 	0.19		 	0.04		Jambi	 	0.84		 	0.32		 	0.21		 	0.08		South	Sumatera	 	0.69		 	0.14		 	0.14		 	0.03		Bengkulu		 	0.91		 	0.87		 	0.24		 	0.23		Lampung	 	0.51		 	0.28		 	0.13		 	0.07		
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Year	 Reform	1968	 Askes,	the	first	health	insurance	scheme	for	civil	servants.	Also,	Taspen	for	pensioners	in	the	public	sector	and	Asabri	for	the	armed	forces	and	police	1970	 Dana	Sehat	(Health	Fund)	was	first	introduced.	Similar	to	community-based	health	insurance	1978	 Astek	(Social	security	for	private	labour)	was	first	introduced,	only	covered	workplaces	>	500	employees	1992	 Astek	was	reformed	into	Jamsostek,	now	covered	workplaces	>	100	employees	
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	 Premium	 Paid	by	 Benefit	(inpatient	ward)	†	1.	Penerima	Bantuan	Iuran	(PBI)	/Contribution	Assistance	Recipients		 Jan	2014	–	Mar	2016:	IDR	19,225	 	 3
rd	class		
2.	Veterans	and	their	dependants		 2.25%	of	third-grade	civil	servants’	basic	payroll*			 	 1st	class		3.	Peserta	Pekerja	Penerima	Upah	(PPU)/	Salaried	workers	including	their	dependants	(max	4):	
	 	 	
3a.	Government	employees	(including	civil	servants,	military	and	police	officers)	 5%	 3%	employer	2%	employee	 Grades	1-2:	2
















































































Table	4-1	Characteristics	of	included	full-text	reviews	(N	=	10)	Review		 AMSTAR	Score*	 ROBIS	score**	 Literature	Search	and	Eligibility	Criteria		 Population	 Intervention	 Outcome	Acharya	et	al.	(2013)	 9	 Low	risk	 Search	Strategy:	Comprehensive	searches	including	grey	literature	Year:	1980	-	2010	Language:	No	language	restriction	
Low-middle	income	countries	(LMIC)	
Health	insurance	 Utilisation	of	health	care,	healthcare	expenditure,	or	health	status	
Giedion	et	al.	(2013)	 7	 Low	risk	 Search	strategy:	Comprehensive	searches	including	grey	literature		Year:	2000-2011	Language:	Only	English	
LMIC	 Any	intervention	under	universal	health	coverage	scheme	
Access	to	health	care,	financial	protection	and	health	status	
Ekman	(2004)	 6	 Low	risk	 Search	strategy:	Comprehensive	searches	including	grey	literature.	Year:	Search	from	1980-2002	Language:		English,	French,	Portuguese,	and	Spanish	
Low	income	countries	 Community-based	health	insurance	 Resource	mobilisation,	quality	of	care,	provider	efficiency,	moral	hazard,	financial	protection,	OOP	spending,	and	access	to	care	
Liang	et	al.	(2012)	 6	 Low	risk	 Search	strategy:	Comprehensive	searchers	including	grey	literature.	Year:	2003-2010	Language:	English	and	Chinese	
China	 Health	insurance	reform	 Health	outcome	and	financial	protection	
Habib	et	al.	(2016)	 6	 High	Risk	 Search	strategy:	Pubmed,	Google	Scholar,	Science	Direct,	and	grey	literatures.	Year:	1995-2015.		Language:	English	
LMIC	 Micro	health	insurance	 Financial	protection		
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Spaan	et	al.	(2012)	 6	 High	risk	 Search	strategy:	Comprehensive	searches	including	grey	literature	Year:	1980-2011.		Language:	English,	French,	Spanish,	or	Portuguese	
LMIC	in	Asia	and	Africa	 Health	Insurance	 Resource	mobilisation,	service	utilisation,	quality	of	care,	financial	protection,	social	inclusion	or	community	empowerment	
Robyn	et	al.	(2013)	 5	 Low	risk	 Search	strategy:	Comprehensive	searches	including	grey	literature	Year:	up	to	January	2010	Language:	no	language	restriction	
Low-middle	income	countries	 Provider	payment	system	in	community-based	health	insurance	
Provider	participation,	satisfaction,	and	retention;	patient	demand;	quantity	and	quality	of	services	provider;	CBHI	coverage	and	financial	performance		Comfort	et	al.	(2013)	 5	 High	risk	 Search	strategy:	key	databases	and	consultation	with	panel	of	experts	Year:	1980-2011	Language:	English	only		
Low	and	middle	income	countries	
Health	Insurance	 Maternal	health	indicators	including	demand,	such	as	utilisation	and	supply,	such	as	quality	of	care	
Yu	et	al.	(2008)	 3	 High	risk	 Search	strategy:	Comprehensive	searches	including	grey	literature	Year:	1991-2008	Language:	English	and	Chinese	
Low-middle	income	countries	 Health	Insurance	 Financial	protection	
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Conflict	of	
interest	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 10%	
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Access to Care (N = 40)
3 and Moderate 3 and Low 2 and Low 1 and Low
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	The	evidence	on	utilisation	can	also	be	grouped	based	on	type	of	care:	curative	or	preventive	care.	The	evidence	on	the	utilisation	of	curative	care	mostly	suggested	a	positive	effect,	with	30	out	of	38	studies	reporting	a	positive	and	statistically	significant	effect.	However,	the	evidence	on	preventive	care	is	less	clear	with	4	out	of	7	studies	reporting	a	positive	effect,	two	studies	found	a	negative	effect	and	one	study	reported	no	effect.		Next,	I	will	present	the	findings	grouped	based	on	country	location	of	the	studies	to	minimise	the	heterogeneity	in	the	structure	of	health	insurance	scheme.		
Table	5-1	Summary	of	studies	reporting	utilisation	of	health	care	(N=40),	by	countries	and	year	Study	 Country	 Insurance*	 Effect	 QUEENS**	 GRADE†	(Robyn	and	et	al.,	2012)	 Burkina	Faso	 CBHI	 0	 3	 Moderate	(Robyn	et	al.,	2012)	 Burkina	Faso	 CBHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Levine,	Polimeni	and	Ramage,	2016)	 Cambodia	 CBHI	 +	 3	 Moderate	(Babiarz	et	al.,	2010)	 China	 SHI	 0	 2	 Low	(Lu,	Liu	and	Shen,	2012)	 China	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Chen,	Liu	and	Xu,	2014)	 China	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Hou	et	al.,	2014)	 China	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Liu	and	Zhao,	2014)	 China	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Cheng	et	al.,	2015)	 China	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Liao,	Gilmour	and	Shibuya,	2016)	 China	 SHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Trujillo	et	al.,	2010)	 Colombia	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Hassan,	Jimenez	and	Montoya,	2013)	 Colombia	 SHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Miller,	Pinto	and	Vera-Hernandez,	2013)	 Colombia	 SHI	 +	 3	 Low	(Hou	and	Chao,	2011)	 Georgia	 SHI	 +	 3	 Low	(Zoidze	et	al.,	2013)	 Georgia	 SHI	 0	 1	 Low	(Gotsadze	et	al.,	2015)	 Georgia	 SHI	 0	 1	 Low	(Blanchet,	Fink	and	Osei-Akoto,	2012)	 Ghana	 SHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Yilma,	Van	Kempen	and	De	Hoop,	2012)	 Ghana	 SHI	 +	 3	 Low	(Abrokwah,	Moser	and	Norton,	2014)	 Ghana	 SHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Brugiavini	and	Pace,	2015)	 Ghana	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Fenny	et	al.,	2015)	 Ghana	 SHI	 +	 1	 Low	(Sheth,	2014)	 India	 CBHI	 -	 3	 Low	(Sood	et	al.,	2014)	 India	 SHI	 0	 2	 Low	(Raza	et	al.,	2016)	 India	 CBHI	 0	 3	 Moderate	(Sparrow	et	al.	2013)	 Indonesia	 SHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Alkenbrack	and	Lindelow,	2015)	 Lao	PDR	 CBHI	 +	 2	 Low	(Rivera-Hernandez	et	al.,	2016)	 Mexico	 SHI	 0	 2	 Low	(Bernal,	Carpio	and	Klein,	2014)		 Peru	 SHI	 +	 3	 Low
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Positive effect No effect Negative effect
Financial Protection (N = 46)
3 and Moderate 3 and Low 2 and Low 1 and Low
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Positive effect No effect Negative effect
Health Status (N = 12)
3 and Moderate 3 and Low 2 and Low 1 and Low
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Equation	6-1	 ! = 	$ + 	&' + (			
		 126	
Thus,	the	interpretation	of	b	in	Equation	6-1	is	the	predicted	change	in	the	probability	of	success	when	x	changes	by	one	unit.	However,	LPM	has	mainly	two	disadvantages:	the	predicted	probability	of	y	is	not	bounded	between	zero	and	one,	and	the	partial	effects	of	any	covariate	are	constant	(Wooldridge,	2013).	To	overcome	this	limitation,	we	can	use	the	binary	response	model.	In	a	binary	response	model,	it	is	assumed	that	the	value	of	y	is	motivated	by	a	latent	continuous	variable	(y*)	which	is	unobservable	(see	Eq.	6-2).	The	primary	objective	is	to	explain	the	effects	of	the	independent	variables	(x)	on	the	response	probability	P	(y	=	1|x),	which	can	be	estimated	by	specifying	a	distribution	function	bounded	between	zero	and	one,	such	as	normal	distribution	(i.e.	the	probit	model)	or	logistic	distribution	(i.e.	the	logit	model)	(Jones,	2007).			
Equation	6-2	 !∗ = 	$ + 	&' + (;	where	! = 	1	+,	!∗ > 0,	or	zero	otherwise	























Study	 Year	 Method†	 Type	of	Data	1.	Propensity	score	matching	(N	=	8)	Koch	and	Alaba	 2010	 Propensity	score	matching	 Cross-section	Blanchet	et	al	 2012	 Propensity	score	matching	 Cross-section	Robyn	et	al	 2012	 Propensity	score	matching	 Cross-section	Avilla-Burgos	et	al	 2013	 Propensity	score	matching	 Cross-section	Nguyen	 2014	 Propensity	score	matching	 Cross-section	Alkenrack	and	Lindelow	 2015	 Propensity	score	matching	 Cross-section	Makhloufi	et	al	 2015	 Propensity	score	matching	 Cross-section	Liao,	Gilmour	and	Shibuya		 2015	 Propensity	score	matching	 Cross-section	2.	Fixed	effect,	random	effect	or	difference-in-difference	(N	=	16)	Babiarz	et	al	 2010	 Difference-in-difference	 Repeated	cross-section		Quimbo	et	al	 2011	 Difference-in-difference	 Randomised	Sosa-Rubi,	Salinas-Rodriguez	and	Galarraga	 2011	 Difference-in-difference	 Panel	Data	Jing	et	al	 2013	 Difference-in-difference	 Repeated	cross-section		Nguyen	and	Wang	 2013	 Difference-in-difference	 Panel	Data	Zoidze	et	al	 2013	 Difference-in-difference	 Repeated	cross-section		Hendriks	et	al	 2014	 Difference-in-difference	 Panel	Data	Sheth	 2014	 Difference-in-difference	 Panel	Data	Yuan	et	al	 2014	 Difference-in-difference	 Panel	Data	Gotsadze	et	al	 2015	 Difference-in-difference	 Repeated	cross-section		Panpiemras	et	al	 2011	 Fixed	effect	 Panel	Data	Robyn	et	al	 2012	 Fixed	effect	 Randomised	Grogger	et	al	 2015	 Fixed	effect	 Panel	Data	Yilma	et	al.	 2015	 Fixed	effect	 Panel	Data	Nguyen	 2016	 Fixed	effect	 Panel	Data	Sepehri	et	al	 2011	 Random	effect	 Panel	Data	3.	Instrumental	variables	(N	=	12)	Trujillo	et	al	 2010	 Instrumental	variables	 Cross-section	Lu,	Liu	and	Shen	 2012	 Instrumental	variables	 Cross-section	Wirtz	et	al	 2012	 Instrumental	variables	 Cross-section	Cheung	and	Padieu	 2013	 Instrumental	variables	 Repeated	cross-section		Fink	et	al	 2013	 Instrumental	variables	 Randomised	Hassan	et	al	 2013	 Instrumental	variables	 Cross-section	Chen	et	al	 2014	 Instrumental	variables	 Repeated	cross-section		Brugiavini	and	Pace	 2015	 Instrumental	variables	 cross-section	Levine,	Polimeni	and	Ramage	 2016	 Instrumental	variables	 Cross-section	Raza	et	al.		 2016	 Instrumental	variables	 Cross-section	
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Equation	7-1	 !456 = ,(845) +	345 + 956 +	:456 	where	,(845)	is	a	function	of	observable	variables,	845;	345	is	the	expected	benefit	from	the	JKN	accruing	to	those	received	it;	956is	a	time-specific	unobservable	common	to	all	participants;	and	:456 is	an	idiosyncratic	error	term.	For	the	uninsured,	we	have:	
Equation	7-2	 !4576 = ;(845) + 9576 +	:4576	345	does	not	appear	in	this	second	equation	because	the	benefits	of	the	scheme	are	assumed	to	be	gained	by	JKN	enrolees	only.	This	implies	the	non-existence	of	the	spillover	effect.	The	changes	before	and	after	the	introduction	of	JKN	(which	I	labelled	0	and	1,	respectively)	for	each	of	these	groups	can	be	written	as:		
Equation	7-3	 ∆!456 = ,(∆845) +	34= + ∆956 +	∆:456 	
Equation	7-4	 ∆!4576 = ;(∆845) + ∆9576 +	∆:4576	The	expected	difference	between	the	changes	among	the	insured	(i.e.	Equation	7-3)	and	the	uninsured	(i.e.	Equation	7-4)	is	therefore	equal	to:		
Equation	7-5	 >>6,76 = @(∆!456) − @(∆!4576)																	= @B,(∆845)C − @B;(∆845)C + @(34=) + ∆956 − ∆9576 + 	@(∆:456) − @(:4576)	
	The	treatment	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	its	enrolees	is	reflected	by	the	@(345	).		
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 	Difference-in-difference		While	PSM	is	able	to	eliminate	bias	due	to	the	observables,	it	is	not	sufficient	for	uncovering	the	programme’s	impact,	34=,	in	Equation	7-5.	To	uncover	the	true	treatment	effect,	the	second	and	third	differences,	i.e.	∆956 − ∆9576 + 	@(∆:456) −@(:4576)	need	to	disappear.	Difference-in-difference	(DID)	is	able	to	eliminate	these	unobservable	biases	using	two	important	assumptions:		(a) The	time-specific	unobservable	factor	exhibits	the	same	trend	between	the	treated	and	the	untreated	(i.e.	the	9′s	change	at	the	same	speed).	This	will	eliminate	the	first	difference	in	unobservables,	i.e.	∆956 − ∆9576 .	
		 164	






Table	7-1	Summary	of	utilisation	profiles,	by	year	and	insurance	status	Variables	 Uninsured		(N	=	8,576)	 JKN	Contributory	(N	=9,82)	 JKN	Subsidised	(N	=	2,503)	2007*	 	 	 	Probability	of	outpatient	visits		 12.0%	 14.4%	 13.2%	Probability	of	inpatient	visits		 2.0%	 3.3%	 1.7%	2014	 	 	 	Probability	of	outpatient	visits		 14.5%	 23.4%	 17.4%	Probability	of	inpatient	visits		 2.6%	 11.2%	 4.2%	
*Since	the	JKN	programme	was	introduced	in	2014,	the	figures	for	JKN	enrolees	in	2007	represented	their	utilisation	
when	they	were	still	uninsured	in	2007.		
































Equation	7-6	FG	 H IJ=KIJL = 	$ + M4N4 +	∑ &484PQR= + S4	,	with:	Pr(V4 = 1	|	84) = 	W4 	V4 	refers	to	my	binary	outcome	variable,	i.e.	the	proportion	of	utilising	care;	84Q 	includes	all	control	variables	described	in	sub-section	7.33	and	&4Q 	is	the	coefficient	for	each	84Q;	α	 is	 the	 model	 intercept,	 and	 S4 	 captures	 random	 error	 term.	 N4 	 represents	 the	insurance	status	with	T	=	1	as	being	insured	and	T	=0	as	being	uninsured.	Thus,	M4 	can	be	 interpreted	 as	 the	 log	 odds	 ratio	 of	 the	 JKN	 programme	 impact	 comparing	 the	
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insured	group	to	the	uninsured.	Given	the	slope’s	coefficient	in	logit	model	no	longer	has	a	marginal	effect	interpretation,	I	calculated	the	partial	effect	at	the	average	(PEA)	referring	 to	 the	 marginal	 effect	 at	 the	 mean	 of	 covariates	 (Wooldridge,	 2013).	 In	addition,	 the	 count	 data	 variable,	 i.e.	 the	 number	 of	 visits,	 is	modelled	 by	 negative	binomial	 regression	model,	which	 is	 similar	 to	 Poisson	model	 but	 allows	 for	 over-dispersion	issue	by	assuming	that	there	will	be	random	variability	among	individuals	who	have	the	same	predicted	value	(Cameron	and	Trivedi,	2010).				
1Table	7-3	Naive	estimator	for	utilisation	of	health	care	
Variables	 Contributory		 Subsidised	
Outpatient	care	 	 	Probability	of	utilising	any	outpatient	visit	in	the	past	month	 6.95***	 2.35***	(%)	 (1.11)	 (0.95)	Number	of	total	visits	(all)	 0.17***	 0.04***		 (0.02)	 (0.02)	Number	of	total	visits	(public)	 0.09***	 0.06***		 (0.01)	 (0.01)	Number	of	total	visits	(private)	 0.08***	 -0.02		 (0.02)	 (0.02)	


















	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Unmatched	 743.34	 <0.01	 16.20	 97.7*	 0.72	 30	 18	 -	1	to	1	matching	 11.87	 1.00	 1.90	 15.50	 1.01	 6	 0	 0	1	to	1	no	replacement	 11.70	 1.00	 2.20	 15.40	 1.05	 3	 0	 0	Nearest	neighbour	matching	(n=5)	caliper	0.01	
4.10	 1.00	 1.20	 9.10	 1.05	 3	 0	 1	
Radius	caliper	0.01	 1.63	 1.00	 0.70	 5.80	 1.03	 0	 0	 1	Kernel	(bandwidth=0.01)	 1.68	 1.00	 0.70	 5.80	 1.04	 0	 0	 1	Kernel	normal	(bandwidth=0.01)	 11.87	 1.00	 1.90	 15.50	 1.01	 6	 0	 0	Mahalanobis		 23.65	 0.89	 1.80	 22.00	 1.35	 6	 0	 0		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Subsidised	group	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Unmatched	 862	 <0.01	 12.7	 115.6*	 1.81	 34	 12	 -	1	to	1	matching	 13.26	 0.998	 2.7	 19.1	 1.11	 12	 3	 0	1	to	1	no	replacement	 14.03	 0.998	 3.1	 19.7	 1.15	 25	 0	 0	Nearest	neighbour	matching	(n=5)	caliper	0.01	
4.30	 1.00	 1.50	 10.90	 1.14	 6	 0	 1	
Radius	caliper	0.01	 2.90	 1.00	 1.20	 8.90	 0.95	 0	 0	 1	Kernel	(bandwidth=0.01)	 2.93	 1.00	 1.20	 9.00	 0.95	 0	 0	 1	Kernel	normal	(bandwidth=0.01)	 13.26	 1.00	 2.70	 19.10	 1.11	 12	 3	 0	Mahalanobis		 32.74	 0.43	 3.10	 30.2*	 1.30	 3	 0	 0	
*	if	B>25%,	R	outside	[0.5;	2]			
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		 	 	 (a)	 	 	 	 	 	 (b)	






to	the	uninsured		 Contributory	 	 	 Subsidised	Outcomes	 ATT	 95%	CI	 	 	 ATT	 95%	CI		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 	 	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Outpatient	care	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Probability	of	having	outpatient	visits	 7.87%***	 4.32%	 11.43%	 	 	 1.96%	 -0.36%	 4.27%	Number	of	visits	(all)	 0.158***	 0.046	 0.269	 	 	 0.063***	 0.016	 0.110	Number	of	visits	(public)	 0.115***	 0.072	 0.158	 	 	 0.059***	 0.024	 0.094	Number	of	visits	(private)	 0.043	 -0.050	 0.135	 	 	 0.004	 -0.028	 0.036		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Inpatient	care	




















Number	of	inpatient	visits	(private)	Subsidised	Group	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Q1	 -1.1	 0.013	 0.009	 0.004	 0.015	 0.010	 0.012	 -0.002	(N	=	2547)	 (2.1)	 (0.046)	 (0.039)	 (0.023)	 (0.010)	 (0.012)	 (0.009)	 (0.006)	Q2	 6.9***	 0.126**	 0.112***	 0.015	 -0.004	 -0.001	 0.010	 -0.011	(N	=	2525)	 (2.7)	 (0.060)	 (0.037)	 (0.034)	 (0.013)	 (0.014)	 (0.014)	 (0.006)	Q3	 0.6	 0.056	 0.087*	 -0.031	 0.032***	 0.042**	 0.033*	 0.009	(N	=	2324)	 (2.1)	 (0.047)	 (0.045)	 (0.033)	 (0.011)	 (0.021)	 (0.019)	 (0.008)	Q4	 1.3	 0.047	 0.066*	 -0.020	 0.030**	 0.049*	 0.039	 0.010	(N=	2011)	 (2.4)	 (0.044)	 (0.034)	 (0.033)	 (0.014)	 (0.028)	 (0.027)	 (0.007)	Q5	 9.3*	 0.180*	 0.044	 0.136*	 0.017	 0.043	 0.009	 0.034	(N=	1653)	 (5.4)	 (0.101)	 (0.060)	 (0.081)	 (0.023)	 (0.049)	 (0.029)	 (0.047)	Urban	 3.2	 0.112***	 0.114***	 -0.002	 0.016*	 0.026*	 0.019	 0.007	(N	=	4545)	 (2.1)	 (0.038)	 (0.028)	 (0.027)	 (0.009)	 (0.016)	 (0.015)	 (0.008)	Rural	 1.1	 0.025	 0.019	 0.006	 0.017**	 0.019*	 0.018**	 0.001	(N	=	6525)	 (0.013)	 (0.037)	 (0.024)	 (0.029)	 (0.007)	 (0.011)	 (0.009)	 (0.005)	Contributory	Group	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Q1		 -2.4	 -0.018	 0.052	 -0.070	 0.041	 0.046	 0.006	 0.040	
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Table	7-6).	Among	the	contributory	group,	enrolees	from	both	rural	and	urban	areas	showed	a	similar	pattern	of	positive	and	significant	effects	on	both	outpatient	and	inpatient	utilisation.	Subsidised	individuals	living	in	rural	areas	showed	a	positive	impact	on	inpatient	utilisation,	whereas	those	living	in	urban	areas	showed	a	positive	impact	only	on	the	frequency	of	outpatient	utilisation	in	public	facilities.			




























Number	of	inpatient	visits	private	Contributory	group	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Q1	 1.6		 0.097		 0.046		 0.051		 2.5		 0.050		 0.038		 0.013		(Lowest)	 (3.9)	 (0.130)	 (0.048)	 (0.136)	 (2.1)	 (0.038)	 (0.025)	 (0.022)	Q2	 11.1***	 0.2**	 0.098***	 0.102		 10.2***	 0.093**	 0.088***	 0.002			 (3.9)	 (0.082)	 (0.036)	 (0.066)	 (2.5)	 (0.037)	 (0.026)	 (0.026)	Q3	 12.9***	 0.243**	 0.143***	 0.099		 8.3***	 0.084***	 0.046**	 0.039			 (4.1)	 (0.108)	 (0.054)	 (0.098)	 (2.3)	 (0.027)	 (0.019)	 (0.020)	Q4	 3.5		 0.067		 0.148***	 -0.081	 10.3***	 0.176***	 0.105***	 0.076***	(Highest)	 (3.1)	 (0.107)	 (0.049)	 (0.101)	 (2.6)	 (0.046)	 (0.027)	 (0.025)	Subsidised	group	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(N	=	1866)	 (3.8)	 (0.081)	 (0.037)	 (0.066)	 (0.019)	 (0.025)	 (0.012)	 (0.023)	Urban	 8.5***	 0.146**	 0.119***	 0.026	 0.097***	 0.128***	 0.082***	 0.046***	(N	=	4224)	 (2.1)	 (0.066)	 (0.025)	 (0.060)	 (0.015)	 (0.021)	 (0.016)	 (0.015)	Rural	 6.8**	 0.199*	 0.109***	 0.090	 0.044**	 0.063**	 0.051***	 0.013	(N	=	5327)	 (3.2)	 (0.111)	 (0.031)	 (0.093)	 (0.018)	 (0.031)	 (0.015)	 (0.020)	
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JKN	Subsidised	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	0.05	 0.030	 0.097**	 0.070**	 0.032	 0.028***	 0.038**	 0.030**	 0.013		 (0.021)	 (0.045)	 (0.032)	 (0.025)	 (0.010)	 (0.016)	 (0.013)	 (0.010)	0.005	 0.030	 0.104**	 0.072**	 0.034	 0.028**	 0.039**	 0.030**	 0.014		 (0.024)	 (0.048)	 (0.035)	 (0.028)	 (0.012)	 (0.018)	 (0.014)	 (0.011)	0.001	 0.031	 0.111**	 0.069*	 0.040	 0.029***	 0.039*	 0.032*	 0.011		 (0.025)	 (0.056)	 (0.040)	 (0.033)	 (0.011)	 (0.021)	 (0.017)	 (0.010)	
JKN	Contributory	





Prob.	of	any	outpatient	care	 0.76%	 0.59	Number	of	outpatient	visits	(total)	 0.018	 0.45	Number	of	outpatient	visits	(public)	 0.021	 0.17	Number	of	outpatient	visits	(private)	 -0.003	 0.87	Prob.	of	any	inpatient	care	 -0.95%	 0.08	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(total)	 -0.010	 0.11	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(public)	 -0.003	 0.40	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(private)	 -0.007	 0.06		 	 	















Sensitivity	analysis	of	the	JKN	effect	on	inpatient	utilisation,	by	the	year	of	interview	(2015	only)			 Treatment	effect	 P-value	 95%	CI	(Lower	-	Upper)			
Contributory	group	 	 	Probability	of	having	inpatient	visits	(%)	 7.03%	 <0.001	 4.01%	 10.05%	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(all)	 0.09	 <0.001	 0.05	 0.12	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(public)	 0.06	 <0.001	 0.04	 0.08	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(private)	 0.03	 0.01	 0.01	 0.06	
Subsidised	group	
	 	 	 		Probability	of	having	inpatient	visits	(%)	 2.31%	 0.01	 0.00%	 4.00%	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(all)	 0.03	 0.04	 0.00	 0.05	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(public)	 0.01	 0.13	 0.00	 0.03	Number	of	inpatient	visits	(private)	 0.01	 0.11	 0.00	 0.03	
		 	































Equation	8-1	 >>6,76 = @(∆!456) − @(∆!4576)																	= @B,(∆845)C − @B;(∆845)C + @(34=) + ∆956 − ∆9576 + 	@(∆:456) − @(:4576)	
















	     Inpatient	 62,885	 90,148	 27,263	 27,613	 -35,272*	Outpatient	 8,507	 11,386	 2,879	 9,612	 1,105	Self-treatment	 6,447	 12,589	 6,142***	 4,424	 -2,022		 	 	 	 	 	
2014	
	     Inpatient	 111,551	 254,271	 142,720	 50,264	 -61,287	Outpatient	 15,987	 18,376	 2,389	 7,696	 -8,291	Self-treatment	 20,306	 25,737	 5,431	 14,579	 -5,726	†	=	The	mean	differences.	Significance	level:	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01		In	addition,	the	contributory	group	had	already	spent	more	OOP	health	expenditure	in	formal	care	(both	outpatient	and	inpatient)	and	self-treatment	in	2007	compared	to	the	other	groups,	and	this	group	continued	to	spend	more	in	2014.	The	contributory	group	spent	IDR	255,000	out-of-pocket	for	paying	inpatient	care,	a	180%	increase	from	the	spending	in	2007.	It	suggests	the	presence	of	selection	bias	for	this	group;	people	who	choose	to	get	insured	under	the	JKN	programme	are	likely	to	demand	more	health	care	and	spend	higher	OOP	health	expenditure	than	the	uninsured	people.			Meanwhile,	the	subsidised	group	generally	spent	less	than	the	uninsured	group,	except	for	outpatient	care	in	2007,	although	the	difference	is	not	significant	at	the	10	percent	level.	Despite	the	indication	of	higher	spending	among	the	contributory	group	and	lower	spending	among	the	subsidised	group	compared	with	the	uninsured,	the	mean	difference	in	health	expenditure	between	the	insured	and	the	uninsured	is	mostly	not	significant,	even	at	the	10	percent	level.	This	non-significant	finding	may	be	explained	by	a	wide	confidence	interval	given	the	skewed	distribution	of	health	care	expenditure	with	a	large	mass	of	zero	values.		
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8.3.1.2 Naïve estimator for individual health expenditure 	Table	8-2	shows	the	marginal	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	untransformed	OOP	health	expenditure	in	2014	without	any	other	control	variables.	It	follows	OLS	regression	with	the	following	equation:		
Equation	8-2	 V4 = 	$ + M4N4 + S4		V4 	refers	to	OOP	health	expenditure;	α	is	the	model	intercept,	and	S4 	captures	random	error	term.	N4 	represents	the	insurance	status	with	T	=	1	as	being	insured	and	T	=0	as	being	uninsured.	Thus,	M4 	can	be	interpreted	as	the	difference	of	incurred	OOP	heath	expenditure	for	the	insured	group	compared	to	the	uninsured.	The	first	column	for	each	expenditure	category,	i.e.	outpatient,	inpatient	and	self-treatment,	presents	the	OLS	model	that	includes	all	samples,	whereas	the	second	column	only	includes	individuals	with	positive	expenditure.	This	table	does	not	demonstrate	the	causal	effect	of	the	JKN	programme;	it	only	serves	as	a	comparison	with	other	findings	in	the	following	section	that	utilise	a	more	robust	method.		
Table	8-2	Regression	table	of	raw/untransformed	OOP	health	expenditure	in	2014	OLS	 Outpatient	[All]	 Outpatient	[Positive]	 Inpatient	[All]	 Inpatient	[Positive]	 Self-treatment	[All]	 Self-treatment	[Positive]		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Panel	A:	Treatment	variable:	JKN	Contributory	Marginal	Effect	 5,207	 75,827	 247,326	 -2,303,019	 2,047	 3,386	SE	 (10,998)	 (84,408)	 (208,709)	 (5,065,580)	 (3,268)	 (4,505)	Observations	 9,547	 1,146	 9,549	 237	 9,549	 6,791	
Panel	B:	Treatment	variable:	JKN	Subsidised	Marginal	Effect	 -14,899	 -100,034	 -62,732*	 -3,815,540*	 -6,662	 -9,434	SE	 (10,098)	 (88,064)	 (36,747)	 (2,200,130)	 (6,789)	 (9,159)	Observations	 11,067	 1,290	 11,069	 241	 11,069	 7,913	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01		As	expected,	the	JKN	contributory	group	spent	higher	levels	of	OOP	in	outpatient	care	and	self-treatment	compared	with	the	uninsured	but	this	increase	is	not	significant.	The	subsidised	group	shows	lower	OOP	expenditure	for	all	categories	compared	with	the	uninsured.	Only	the	effect	on	inpatient	care	is	significant	at	the	10	percent	level.	
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On	average,	people	in	the	subsidised	group	spend	IDR	15,000,	IDR	62,000	and	IDR	6,600	less	on	outpatient,	inpatient	and	self-treatment	costs	respectively,	compared	with	the	uninsured.			Table	8-3	presents	the	marginal	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	three	categories	of	OOP	health	expenditure	costs	according	to	a	two-part	model	(2PM)	approach.	The	first	part	models	zeros	in	OOP	health	expenditure,	which	is	typically	handled	using	a	model	for	the	probability	of	a	positive	outcome:		
Equation	8-3	 φ(Y	 > 	0) 	= 	Pr(Y	 > 	0|X) 	= 	F(Xδ)		Where	X	is	a	vector	of	control	variables,	δ	is	the	corresponding	vector	of	parameters	to	be	estimated,	and	F	is	the	cumulative	distribution	function	of	an	independent	identically	distributed	error	term,	typically	solved	by	either	logit	or	probit	model	(Belotti	et	al.,	2015).	The	second	part	handles	positive	OOP	expenditures,	which	is	usually	represented	as:	
Equation	8-4	 φ(Y|Y	 > 	0, X) 	= 	G(Xγ)		Where	X	is	a	vector	of	control	variables,	γ	is	the	corresponding	vector	of	parameters	to	be	estimated,	and	G	is	an	appropriate	density	function	for	Y|Y	>	0.	In	this	analysis,	the	first	part	used	a	probit	model	to	estimate	the	probability	of	incurring	positive	OOP	expenditure,	while	the	second	part	used	GLM	regression	based	on	a	Gamma	distribution	with	the	log	link	function	to	model	the	positive	OOP	expenditure.			According	to	Table	8-3,	there	is	no	significant	effect	on	outpatient	OOP	expenditure	for	the	contributory	group.	Meanwhile,	the	contributory	group	is	2	percent	more	likely	to	have	positive	expenditure,	and	out	of	those	who	spend	positive	expenditure,	the	contributory	group	spend	IDR	168,000	more	than	the	uninsured	group.	However,	only	the	first	part	is	significant	at	the	1	percent	level.	Finally,	the	JKN	programme	decreases	the	probability	of	incurring	positive	self-treatment	costs	among	the	contributory	group	but	does	not	have	much	effect	on	the	actual	self-treatment	cost.		
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Table	8-3	Regression	table	of	the	two-part	model	analysis	on	OOP	health	expenditure	in	2014			 Outpatient	OOP	 Inpatient	OOP	 Self-treatment			 First	part	 Second	part	 First	part	 Second	part	 First	part	 Second	part		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Panel	A:	Treatment	variable:	JKN	Contributory	Marginal	Effect	 0.00	 7,569	 0.02***	 167,658	 -0.03*	 1,380	SE	 (0.01)	 (6,536.00)	 (0.00)	 (69,404.32)	 (0.02)	 (1,962.36)	
Panel	B:	Treatment	variable:	JKN	Subsidised	Marginal	Effect	 -0.02**	 -5,288	 0.00	 -53,799	 0.01	 -3,987	SE	 (0.01)	 (5,055.42)	 (0.00)	 (41,161.55)	 (0.01)	 (2,840.71)	Significance	level	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01		According	to	panel	B	in	Table	8-3,	the	subsidised	group	is	two	percent	less	likely	to	incur	OOP	expenditure	for	outpatient	care	but	there	is	no	significant	effect	on	the	actual	cost.	The	JKN	programme	also	decreases	the	actual	cost	of	inpatient	care	and	self-treatment	for	the	subsidised	group,	but	neither	of	these	is	significant	at	even	the	10	percent	level.			Overall,	it	is	suggested	that	the	JKN	programme	increases	the	OOP	expenditure	for	the	contributory	group	but	decreases	the	OOP	expenditure	for	the	subsidised	group.	However,	none	of	these	effects	on	the	positive	expenditure	are	significant	at	the	10	percent	level.	The	two-part	model	can	solve	the	skewed	distribution	of	health	expenditure	data,	but	it	is	unable	to	control	for	the	insurance	selection	bias.	Next,	I	will	present	the	findings	from	the	PSM-DID	analysis,	which	is	more	robust	in	controlling	for	insurance	selection	bias.				 	
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8.3.1.3 PSM-DID analysis 	
		 	 	 (a)	 	 	 	 	 (b)	






Table	8-4	Results	of	the	PSM-DID	analysis	of	the	impact	of	the	JKN	programme	on	OOP	health	expenditure			 Outpatient	OOP	 Inpatient	OOP	 Self-treatment		 PSM	 PSM-DID	 PSM	 PSM-DID	 PSM	 PSM-DID		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
Panel	A:	Treatment	variable:	JKN	Contributory	ATT	 6,818	 8,417	 240,365	 154,914	 6,714	 -1,583	SE	 (13,497)	 (9,819)	 (176,500)	 (124,647)	 (6,715)	 (6,274)	
	











urban/rural	area		 Inpatient	OOP	 Outpatient	OOP	 Self-treatment	JKN	Contributory	 	  Q1	 63,710	 -10,549	 -2,141		 (59,011)	 (8,281)	 (12,519)	
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8.3.2.1 Descriptive summary 	Table	8-6	presents	the	descriptive	statistics	for	both	the	outcome	and	the	control	variables.	On	average,	the	insured	households	were	more	likely	to	live	in	an	urban	area,	have	the	head	of	household	who	only	finished	primary	education,	have	bigger	household	size,	report	more	acute	conditions	affecting	daily	activities,	utilise	more	health	care,	and	come	from	lower	socioeconomic	status	compared	to	the	uninsured	households.			Looking	at	the	amount	of	OOP	health	expenditure,	the	insured	household	spent,	on	average,	IDR	9,600	less	than	the	uninsured	household	in	the	baseline	year	and	this	difference	is	significant	at	the	1	percent	level.	However,	the	insured	increased	their	spending	in	2014	to	almost	the	same	level	as	the	uninsured,	thereby	closing	the	gap	between	the	insured	and	the	uninsured.			Turning	to	the	catastrophic	health	expenditure	(CHE)	measures,	the	insured	households	had	a	lower	incidence	of	CHE	in	2007	compared	with	the	uninsured	and	these	differences	are	significant	at	a	5	percent	level	for	two	out	of	three	CHE	indicators.	Aligned	with	my	observation	on	the	amount	of	OOP	health	expenditure	spent,	the	differences	between	the	CHE	indicators	are	no	longer	significant	in	2014.						
Table	8-6	Descriptive	statistics	of	IFLS	household	data,	2007–2014			 2007	 		 2014	
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Variables	 Uninsured	(N=3,720)	 JKN	insured	(N=2,027)	 Mean	difference	
	 Uninsured	(N=3,720)	 JKN	insured	(N=2,027)	 Mean	difference	
Outcome	variables	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		OOP	health	expenditure†	 42,073	 32,426	 -9,646***	 	 54,826	 55,070	 243	OOP/total	expenditure	>	10%	 4.20%	 3.40%	 -0.80%	 	 4.70%	 5.10%	 0.50%	OOP/total	expenditure	>	25%	 1.30%	 0.70%	 -0.6%**	 	 1.00%	 1.10%	 0.10%	OOP/non-food	expenditure	>	40%	 3.90%	 2.80%	 -1.1%**	 	 3.80%	 4.00%	 0.20%	
Control	variables	
	       Gender	of	the	head	of	household	 68.40%	 69.70%	 1.30%	 	 68.40%	 69.70%	 1.30%	Urban/Rural	 44.30%	 49.90%	 5.6%***	 	 44.30%	 49.90%	 5.6%***	Age	of	the	head	of	household	 41.17	 40.78	 -0.39	 	 47.68	 47.28	 -0.40	Educational	level	of	the	head	of	household	 	       Primary	 45.70%	 49.50%	 3.8%***	 	 44.50%	 48.90%	 4.4%***	Secondary	 40.80%	 38.80%	 -2.00%	 	 41.20%	 38.80%	 -2.4%*	University	 5.60%	 4.70%	 -0.90%	 	 6.90%	 5.60%	 -1.3%*	Household	size	 3.81	 4.09	 0.27***	 	 3.78	 4.13	 0.35***	Number	of	acute	conditions	affecting	daily	activities	 2.12	 2.20	 0.08*	 	 3.36	 3.64	 0.28***	Number	of	chronic	conditions	 0.17	 0.15	 -0.02*	 	 0.34	 0.34	 0.00	Any	disability	 1.60%	 2.30%	 0.7%*	 	 15.60%	 16.40%	 0.80%	Any	utilisation	(outpatient	or	inpatient	in	the	past	year)	 25.10%	 27.50%	 2.4**	 	 29.60%	 38.20%	 8.6***	Total	household	expenditure†	 	1,800,000		 	1,653,000		 	-147,112***		 		 	2,497,000		 	2,326,000		 	-170,610***		
Significance	level	*	p<0.1;	**	p<0.05;	***	p<0.01		
8.3.2.2 Impact estimates 	Table	8-7	displays	the	estimated	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	the	actual	health	expenditure	for	households.	The	first	column	presents	the	cross-sectional	regression	on	untransformed	health	expenditure	in	2014,	controlling	for	demographic	characteristics,	educational	status,	total	household	expenditure,	the	presence	of	medical	conditions	and	the	use	of	any	type	of	formal	health	care.	The	OLS	model	is	based	on:		
Equation	8-5	
V4 = 	$ + M4N4 +	_&484PQR= + S4 	
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Where	Y	refers	to	OOP	health	expenditure;	84Q 	includes	all	control	variables	described	above	and	&4Q 	is	the	coefficient	for	each	84Q;	α	is	the	model	intercept,	and	S4 	captures	random	error	term.	I	found	that	JKN	insured	households	on	average	spend	IDR	2,600	more	than	uninsured	households,	a	relatively	small	difference,	but	this	effect	is	not	significant	at	10	percent	level.	In	the	second	column,	the	log	of	health	expenditure	is	used	instead,	which	is	then	re-transformed	to	the	actual	cost	again	by	applying	the	Duan	smearing	approach.	The	effect	becomes	smaller,	but	it	is	still	not	significant.			















































































































































































































































Difference-in-Differences (DID) with regression I	begin	by	estimating	conventional	parametric	DID	models	for	the	outcomes.	Consider	the	following	equation:	
Equation	9-1	 V45 = 	&l + &=N5 +	&b>45 +	&cN5 × >45 +	8459 +	ni + :45			
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where		V45	stands	for	the	outcome	variables	for	individual	+	in	year	o.	The	year	dummy	N5	captures	aggregate	factors	that	would	cause	changes	in	outcome	variables	even	in	the	 absence	 of	 a	 policy	 change.	 >45	is	 the	 treatment	 group	 dummy	 that	 captures	possible	 differences	 between	 the	 treatment	 and	 control	 groups	 prior	 to	 the	introduction	of	JKN	programme	in	2014.	N5 × >45	is	the	interaction	between	the	year	and	 the	 treatment	dummy	which	 is	 the	 regressor	 of	 interest:	 it	 gives	us	 the	 causal	reform	effect,	provided	the	assumptions	required	in	the	DID	approach	are	satisfied.	State	 dummies,	 ni	 ,	 account	 for	 permanent	 differences	 across	 the	 13	 Indonesian	provinces.	845	contains	1	x	K	column	vector	of	control	variables.	As	usual,	:45	stands	for	unobserved	heterogeneity	and	is	assumed	to	be	normally	distributed	with	zero	mean.			DID	is	usually	estimated	by	ordinary	least	squares	and	the	treatment	effect	is	easily	identifiable	 from	 the	 sign	 and	 statistical	 significance	 of	 &c	 in	 Equation	 1.	 Binary	outcomes	can	also	be	estimated	with	DID	using	nonlinear	model,	such	as	probit	or	logit	model.	However,	the	treatment	effect,	unlike	in	the	linear	model,	 is	not	equal	to	the	interaction	term	and	it	cannot	be	constant	across	the	treated	population	because	the	expectation	of	the	outcome	variables	is	bounded	between	zero	and	one.	It	has	been	shown	 that	 the	 treatment	 effect	 in	 nonlinear	 DID	 is	 the	 cross	 difference	 of	 the	conditional	 expectation	 of	 the	observed	outcome	minus	 the	 cross	 difference	 of	 the	conditional	expectation	of	the	counterfactual	outcome	(Puhani,	2012).	The	sign	of	the	treatment	effect	in	any	strictly	monotonic	transformation	model,	such	as	logit,	probit,	and	 tobit,	 is	 the	 same	as	 the	 sign	of	 the	coefficient	of	 the	 interaction	 term	(Puhani,	2012;	Karaca-Mandic,	Norton	and	Dowd,	2012).	Since	all	outcomes	in	this	analysis	are	binary,	 I	 estimated	 all	 regression	models	 using	 both	OLS	 and	 logit	 to	 compare	 the	consistency	of	any	observed	findings.			Because	 of	 serial	 correlation	 in	 panel	 data,	 conventional	 DID	 standard	 errors	may	understate	 the	 standard	 deviation	 of	 the	 estimated	 treatment	 effects,	 leading	 to	serious	 overestimation	 of	 t-statistics	 and	 significance	 levels	 (Bertrand,	 Duflo	 and	Mullainathan,	 2004).	 A	 simple	method	 to	 correct	 this	 serial	 correlation	 issue	 is	 by	clustering	over	the	individuals	to	obtain	cluster-robust	standard	errors.			
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Difference-in-differences	assumes	that	outcome	trends	are	similar	between	the	insured	and	uninsured	groups	before	the	intervention	and	that	the	only	factors	explaining	changes	in	outcomes	between	the	two	groups	are	constant	over	time.	It	implies	that	the	outcomes	would	have	moved	in	parallel	trend	between	the	insured	and	uninsured	groups	in	the	absence	of	the	programme.	A	falsification	test	requiring	two	rounds	of	data	available	before	the	start	of	the	programme	can	verify	whether	any	difference	in	trends	appears	between	the	two	groups	before	the	implementation	of	the	programme.	By	plotting	the	mean	of	outcome	variables	for	each	year	between	the	insured	and	uninsured,	we	can	physically	observe	any	trend	difference	prior	to	the	reform.	I	run	placebo	regression	assuming	counterfactually	that	the	JKN	programme	took	place	in	a	different	year.	Should	the	coefficient	of	interest	be	significant	in	a	non-reform	year,	the	common	time	trend	assumption	would	be	seriously	challenged	(Lechner,	2010;	Ziebarth	and	Karlsson,	2014).			
PSM and DID approach As	in	Chapter	7	and	8,	I	also	estimated	the	treatment	effect	of	JKN	programme	using	the	combination	of	propensity	score	matching	(PSM)	and	difference-in-difference	(DID).	The	most	attractive	feature	of	propensity	score	matching	compared	to	regression	type	estimators	is	its	nonparametric	nature	as	PSM	assumes	a	flexible	functional	form	to	estimate	the	outcome	model	(Rosenbaum	and	Rubin,	1983).	While	PSM	controls	for	any	observed	confounders,	DID	removes	the	time	constant	confounders.		The	PSM-DID	approach	follows	the	following	equation:		
Equation	9-2	 >>6,76 = @(∆!456) − @(∆!4576)																	= @B,(∆845)C − @B;(∆845)C + @(34=) + ∆956 − ∆9576 + 	@(∆:456) − @(:4576)		If	we	observe	two	sets	of	outcomes	–	!456 ,	the	outcome	among	the	JKN	enrolees;	!4576 ,	the	outcome	for	the	uninsured,	the	difference-in-difference	treatment	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	can	be	obtained	by	taking	the	expected	difference	between	the	changes	among	the	insured	[@(∆!456)	]	and	the	uninsured	[@(∆!4576)].	This	equation	can	be	solved	by	functions	of	observables	and	unobservables	as	shown	in	the	second	
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line	of	Equation	8-1.	The	first	difference	in	the	second	line	of	Equation	9-2,	i.e.	@B,(∆845)C − @B;(∆845)C,	represents	the	differences	of	changes	in	outcomes	due	to	the	difference	in	observables.	This	first	difference	can	be	eliminated	through	matching	each	treated	individual	with	one	or	more	untreated	individuals	who	are	similar	in	terms	of	observable	variables	(845).	The	treatment	effect	of	the	JKN	programme	on	its	enrolees	is	reflected	by	the	@(345	).	The	second	difference,	i.e.	∆956 − ∆9576 ,	represents	the	difference	of	time-specific	unobservable	factor,	common	to	all	individuals	in	each	group,	between	the	treated	and	the	untreated.	For	example,	it	can	represent	the	change	in	economic	shock	or	new	legislation	that	occurs	in	national	level.	To	eliminate	this,	we	need	to	assume	that	the	time-fixed	unobservable	factor	for	both	insured	and	uninsured	change	at	the	same	trend.			The	 propensity	 score	 was	 predicted	 based	 on	 logit	 regression	 estimates	 of	 the	probability	of	an	individual	enrolling	in	the	JKN	programme	in	2014	as	a	function	of	the	control	variables	in	2007.	The	propensity	score	for	each	voluntary	and	subsidised	group	were	 estimated	 separately.	 The	use	of	 covariates	 from	2007	 instead	of	 from	2014	was	 chosen	 to	minimise	 a	 reverse	 causality	 issue.	 In	 addition,	 I	 included	 the	sample	 weight	 accounting	 both	 complex	 survey	 design	 and	 attrition	 rate	 into	 our	propensity	 score	 estimation	 (DuGoff,	 Schuler,	 and	 Stuart,	 2014).	 Based	 on	 the	coefficient	 estimates	 from	 the	 logit	 model,	 I	 constructed	 a	 propensity	 score	 that	allowed	us	to	quantify	the	distance	between	each	of	the	treated	and	untreated	cases	in	the	sample.	This	propensity	score	is	essentially	the	predicted	probability	of	being	in	the	 treated	 (insured)	 group.	 I	 applied	 the	 common	 support	 rule	 that	 observations	whose	 propensity	 score	 is	 higher	 than	 the	 maximum	 or	 less	 than	 the	 minimum	propensity	 score	of	 the	 controls	 are	 excluded.	 I	 also	 excluded	 the	 treated	 cases	 for	which	a	sufficiently	close	match	could	not	be	 found	among	 the	controls,	and	 it	was	determined	by	choice	of	bandwidth	or	caliper,	as	described	below.			In	this	analysis,	I	used	nearest	neighbour	matching	in	which	we	matched	each	treated	case	with	the	five	‘nearest’	untreated	cases.	In	addition	to	matching	each	treated	case	with	the	five	nearest	untreated	cases,	I	also	set	the	maximum	distance	of	propensity	score	between	 the	 treated	and	non-treated	case	with	a	pre-defined	caliper	0.01.	As	
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Table	9-1	Descriptive	table	of	hypertension	rates,	by	year	and	insurance	status			 Uninsured	 Contributory	 Subsidised		 2007	 2014	 2007	 2014	 2007	 2014	SBP	(in	mmHg)	 127.045	 131.817	 124.573	 128.814	 127.015	 131.807	DBP	(in	mmHg)	 79.081	 80.364	 78.829	 79.851	 78.891	 80.184	Prevalence*	(in	%)	 24.4	 34.4	 21.3	 30.6	 24	 34.5	Awareness^	(in	%)	 28.8	 41.2	 27.6	 51.8	 25.6	 41.4	Treatment†	(in	%)	 17.5	 10.8	 15.1	 18.1	 15.8	 8.5	Controlled††	(in	%)	 29.1	 21.2	 27.6	 30	 26.4	 31	*Prevalence:	The	union	of	elevated	blood	pressure	(Systolic/Diastolic	>	140/90	mmHg)	and	self-reported	of	hypertension	diagnosis/total	sample.	^Awareness:	Hypertensive	individuals	who	were	aware	of	their	condition/hypertensive	individuals	†Treatment:	Hypertensive	individuals	who	took	medication	to	lower	their	blood	pressure/hypertensive	individuals	††Control:	Hypertensive	individuals	with	normal	BP	and	taking	medication/hypertensive	individuals	who	took	medication		Table	9	2	presents	a	summary	of	the	descriptive	statistics	for	control	variables	used	in	the	analysis.	The	contributory	group	is	more	likely	to	be	female	and	younger,	have	higher	BMI,	live	in	urban	area,	come	from	the	richest	population,	be	highly	educated,	be	a	non-smoker,	and	have	been	diagnosed	diabetes	mellitus	by	a	health	professional.	On	the	other	hand,	the	subsidised	group	is	more	likely	to	be	older,	come	from	the	poorest	population	and	have	no	education.	Both	the	subsidised	and	uninsured	are	more	likely	to	be	a	smoker	than	the	contributory	group.	Table	9-3	shows	that	this	prediction	is	correct	that	the	richest	has	the	highest	awareness	and	treatment	rate	while	the	poorest	has	the	lowest	one.	This	pattern	also	persists	from	2007	to	2014	suggesting	that	this	inequality	has	already	existed	prior	to	the	introduction	of	JKN	programme	in	2014.	However,	the	controlled	rate	which	presents	the	success	of	blood	pressure	management	shows	a	pro-poor	pattern	in	2007,	i.e.	the	first	and	second	quintiles	had	higher	controlled	rate	than	richer	quintiles;	however,	the	poorest	quintile	had	a	large	drop	in	controlled	level	in	2014	making	it	similar	to	the	richest	quintile.			
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Table	9-3	presents	the	distribution	of	systolic	and	diastolic	across	year,	wealth	quintiles,	and	rural/urban	area.	Systolic	and	diastolic	in	all	quintiles	show	an	increasing	trend	and	the	difference	between	the	poorest	and	the	richest	appears	small	clinically.	Awareness	and	treatment	rate	imply	access	to	health	care	facilities.	Based	on	the	finding	of	the	JKN	programme	effect	on	utilisation	of	health	care	in	the	previous	chapter,	it	is	predicted	to	observe	higher	awareness	and	treatment	rate	among	the	richest	quintile.			
Table	9-2	Descriptive	table	of	control	variables,	by	year	and	insurance	status			 Uninsured	 Contributory	 Subsidised	Control	variables	 2007	 2014	 2007	 2014	 2007	 2014	
Age	(years)	 37.19	 43.71	 33.8	 40.33	 37.34	 43.82	18-29	year	 37.50%	 18.40%	 44.60%	 22.10%	 35.10%	 16.10%	30-39	year	 22.80%	 27.70%	 25.90%	 32.50%	 26.30%	 28.80%	40-49	year	 18.50%	 20.60%	 16.50%	 21.80%	 18.40%	 23.20%	50-59	year	 12.30%	 17.20%	 7.90%	 13.60%	 10.70%	 16.10%	60-69	year	 6.40%	 9.40%	 3.90%	 6.80%	 7.10%	 9.10%	>	70	year	 2.50%	 6.70%	 1.20%	 3.20%	 2.40%	 6.70%	
Marital	status	
	      Single	 18.90%	 8.70%	 24.40%	 9.50%	 14.70%	 6.10%	Married	 72.50%	 78.50%	 71.90%	 82.20%	 77.30%	 81.70%	Previously-married	 8.60%	 12.80%	 3.70%	 8.40%	 8.00%	 12.30%	
Male	 45.70%	 45.70%	 42.10%	 42.10%	 44.90%	 44.90%	
Urban		 41.20%	 47.30%	 71.20%	 73.90%	 40.80%	 51.90%	
Wealth	quintiles	
	      Quintile	1	(the	poorest)	 18.40%	 19.10%	 7.30%	 9.00%	 30.70%	 28.60%	Q2	 20.40%	 20.20%	 13.10%	 15.80%	 27.60%	 25.70%	Q3	 21.20%	 21.50%	 22.40%	 22.70%	 20.40%	 20.40%	Q4	 21.50%	 21.70%	 27.20%	 22.00%	 13.70%	 16.40%	Quintile	5	(the	richest)	 18.40%	 17.50%	 29.90%	 30.50%	 7.60%	 8.80%	
Education	status	
	      No	education	 9.30%	 8.50%	 3.10%	 2.30%	 9.90%	 9.30%	Primary	education	 41.10%	 40.50%	 21.60%	 21.00%	 50.10%	 49.40%	Secondary		 44.80%	 43.30%	 61.40%	 59.20%	 38.40%	 38.00%	Higher		 4.80%	 7.50%	 14.00%	 17.50%	 1.60%	 3.20%	
BMI	(kg/m2)	 22.33	 23.57	 22.95	 24.39	 21.89	 22.99	Underweight	 14.70%	 10.30%	 12.50%	 8.90%	 16.40%	 12.40%	Normal	BMI	 63.40%	 55.60%	 59.10%	 48.00%	 64.40%	 58.20%	Overweight	 21.90%	 33.40%	 28.40%	 42.80%	 19.10%	 28.60%	Obese	 4.40%	 8.00%	 6.20%	 11.40%	 2.80%	 6.10%	
History	of	Diabetes		 0.70%	 2.30%	 1.30%	 4.10%	 0.20%	 2.00%	
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Smoking	status	
	      Non-smoker	 64.50%	 60.80%	 70.70%	 67.60%	 63.60%	 60.20%	Ex-smoker	 2.10%	 5.20%	 2.00%	 5.30%	 1.80%	 4.80%	Light	(1-10	cig/day)	 10.40%	 10.20%	 10.90%	 9.00%	 11.80%	 10.30%	Medium	(11-20)	 19.10%	 18.20%	 13.10%	 14.90%	 19.70%	 20.10%	Heavy	(>20)	 3.80%	 5.70%	 3.30%	 3.30%	 3.20%	 4.50%	
Physical	activity	
	      Low	 22.00%	 40.50%	 30.30%	 47.90%	 20.20%	 36.50%	Moderate	 33.20%	 24.50%	 32.40%	 24.50%	 30.40%	 24.20%	High	 44.80%	 30.40%	 37.40%	 23.80%	 49.40%	 35.00%	Table	9-3	shows	that	this	prediction	is	correct	that	the	richest	has	the	highest	awareness	and	treatment	rate	while	the	poorest	has	the	lowest	one.	This	pattern	also	persists	from	2007	to	2014	suggesting	that	this	inequality	has	already	existed	prior	to	the	introduction	of	JKN	programme	in	2014.	However,	the	controlled	rate	which	presents	the	success	of	blood	pressure	management	shows	a	pro-poor	pattern	in	2007,	i.e.	the	first	and	second	quintiles	had	higher	controlled	rate	than	richer	quintiles;	however,	the	poorest	quintile	had	a	large	drop	in	controlled	level	in	2014	making	it	similar	to	the	richest	quintile.		
	
Table	9-3	Blood	pressure	and	hypertension	rate	in	2007	and	2014	across	wealth	quintiles	and	urban/rural	area,	all	


















































































































































































































































































































10.2.2.1 Defining access to care 	Measuring	access	to	care	is	key	to	understanding	and	developing	health	policy,	but	there	is	a	lack	of	agreement	on	the	definition	of	access	in	the	literature.	The	most	commonly	cited	framework	of	access	to	care	is	Andersen’s	access	to	care	model	which	was	developed	in	late	1960s	to	explain	factors	affecting	access	to	medical	care	in	the	United	States	of	America	(Andersen,	1968).	Andersen	argued	that	access	can	be	broken	down	further	into	two	distinct	components,	potential	access	and	realised	access.	Potential	access	is	measured	by	enabling	factors	that	give	patients	the	opportunity	to	access	care.	For	example,	health	insurance	is	assumed	to	provide	greater	access	to	care	for	patients.	Therefore,	health	insurance	coverage	indicates	potential	access	that	may	or	may	not	be	realised	by	the	patients	(Andersen,	2008).	Another	example	is	the	availability	of	health	care	facilities.	Individuals	who	live	in	an	area	with	a	greater	choice	of	health	care	providers	are	considered	to	have	better	potential	access	to	care	(Gulliford	et	al.,	2002).	Potential	access	may	help	to	explain	how	patients	are	able	to	access	the	care	but	it	does	not	explain	whether	patients	actually	use	the	care	–	this	is	measured	by	realised	access.	Realised	access	is	commonly	measured	by	utilisation	indicators,	including	outpatient,	inpatient,	dental,	maternal	and	emergency	care.	Andersen’s	model	is	therefore	useful	as	a	conceptual	framework	for	exploring	the	relationship	between	potential	access	(for	example,	health	insurance	or	other	financial	incentives)	and	realised	access.			Measuring	utilisation	can	be	seen	as	an	objective	indicator	of	access	and	this	explains	its	popularity	in	studies	of	access	to	care	(for	example,	Bernal,	Carpio	and	Klein,	2014;	Sparrow,	Suryahadi	and	Widyanti,	2013;	Sommers,	Baicker	and	Epstein,	2012;	Kisa	and	MZ,	2007).	Findings	from	the	reviews	in	Chapters	4	and	5	have	indicated	that	access	to	care	is	uniformly	defined	as	utilisation	of	health	care	which	may	vary	from	visits	to	primary	care	clinics	to	hospitalisation.	However,	solely	measuring	utilisation	may	prove	inadequate	for	exploring	the	reasons	why	access	is	not	realised.	Another	alternative	model	has	been	proposed	by	Penchansky	and	Thomas	(1981)	as	a	critique	of	the	initial	1960s	Andersen	model.	They	assert	that	access	is	a	
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multidimensional	term	which	makes	it	impossible	to	measure	using	one	factor	alone.	They	suggest	that	access	has	five	interrelated	dimensions,	including	availability	(for	example,	the	supply-side	of	health	services),	accessibility	(for	example,	transportation),	accommodation	(for	example,	quality	and	support	systems	in	health	care	facilities),	affordability	(for	example,	the	price)	and	acceptability	(for	example,	trust	between	patient	and	doctor).	This	model	can	be	seen	as	an	extension	of	the	potential	access	concept,	as	all	five	dimensions	are	closely	related	to	the	predisposing	characteristics	and	enabling	factors	found	in	Andersen’s	model	(Andersen,	1995).	However,	Penchansky	and	Thomas’	model	regards	all	five	dimensions	as	equal	which	means	improving	access	to	care	cannot	be	reached	successfully	without	considering	all	five	dimensions.	Providing	health	insurance	may	increase	the	affordability	dimension,	but	it	may	not	be	enough	to	build	trust	between	patient	and	provider	(acceptability)	or	cover	the	transportation	costs	required	to	reach	the	clinic	or	hospital	(accessibility).			

























































Table	A-1	Search	strategies	for	the	review	of	review	in	Chapter	4		Databases	 	Database	of	Abstracts	and	Reviews	of	Effect	(DARE)	Host	 Centre	for	Reviews	and	Disseminations	(CRD)	Date	of	search	 01	December	2017	Years	covered	 1965	to	December	2017	Search	strategy	 Any	field:	health	insurance	NOT	cost-effectiveness		Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 284	records		 Databases	 Cochrane	Database	of	Systematic	Reviews	Host	 Wiley	online	library	Date	of	search	 07	March	2016	Years	covered	 1965	to	March	2016	Search	strategy	 (all	search	terms	are	in	title,	abstract,	and	keywords)	#1												((developing	next	countr*)	or	("low	income”	next	countr*)	or	(“middle	income”next	countr*)	or	(under-developed	next	countr*)	or	(less-developed	next	countr*)	or	("third	world”next	countr*))	#2		 MeSH	descriptor	Developing	Countries	explode	all	trees			#3			 MeSH	descriptor	Insurance,	Health	explode	all	trees			 	#4		 insurance	 	#5		 (#1	OR		#2)	 	#6		 (#3	OR	#4)	 	#7	 (#5	AND	#6)		 		Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 198	records			 Databases	 CINAHL	Plus	Host	 EBSCO		Date	of	search	 1	December	2017	Years	covered	 1965	to	December	2017	Search	strategy	 S1	 (MH	"Insurance,	Health+")	S2	 (MH	“Prospective	Payment	System+”)	S3	 TI	health	insurance	S4	 Health	insurance	S5	 (MH	"Insurance,	Health,	Reimbursement+")	S6	 	(MH	"Health	Insurance	Exchanges")	S7	 S1	OR	S2	OR	S3	OR	S4	OR	S5	OR	S6	S8	 ("developing	countr*"	or	"developing	countr*"	or	"low	income	countr*"	or	"middle	income	countr*"	or	"under-developed	countr*"	or	"less-developed	countr*"	or	"third	world	countr*")	S9	 	(MM	"Developing	Countries")	S10	 TI	(Bangladesh	or	Benin	or	“Burkina	Faso”	or	Burundi	or	“Central	African	Republic”	or	Chad	or	Comoros	or	Congo	or	Kongo	or	Eritrea	or	Ethiopia	or	Gambia	or	Guinea	or	“Guinea-Bissau”	or	Haiti	or	Kenya	or	Kyrgyz	or	Liberia	or	Madagascar	or	Malawi	or	Mali	or	Mozambique	or	Myanmar	or	Nepal	or	Niger	or	Rwanda	or	
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“Sierra	Leone”	or	Somalia	or	Tajikistan	or	Tanzania	or	Togo	or	Uganda	or	Zimbabwe)	S11	 TI	(South	Sudan	or	Kiribati	or	Lao	or	Samoa	or	“Solomon	Islands”	or	“Timor	Leste”	or	Tuvalu	or	Vanuatu	or	Afghanistan	or	Bhutan)	S12	 TI	(Armenia	or	Bolivia	or	Cameroon	or	“Cape	Verde”	or	Congo	or	“Côte	d’Ivoire”	or	Djibouti	or	Egypt	or	“El	Salvador”	or	Georgia	or	Ghana	or	Guatemala	or	Guyana	or	Honduras	or	Indonesia	or	Lesotho	or	Mauritania	or	Moldova	or	Morocco	or	Nicaragua	or	Nigeria	or	Pakistan	or	“Papua	New	Guinea”	or	Paraguay	or	Philippines	or	“Sao	Tome	and	Principe”	or	Senegal	or	“Sri	Lanka”	or	Sudan	or	Syrian	or	Ukraine	or	Uzbekistan	or	Vietnam	or	Yemen	or	Zambia)	S13	 TI	(Albania	or	Algeria	or	Angola	or	Argentina	or	Azerbaijan	or	Belarus	or	“Bosnia	and	Herzegovina”	or	Botswana	or	Brazil	or	Bulgaria	or	China	or	Colombia	or	“Costa	Rica”	or	Cuba	or	“Dominican	Republic”	or	Ecuador	or	Gabon	or	Hungary	or	Iran	or	Iraq	or	Jamaica	or	Jordan	or	Kazakhstan	or	Lebanon	or	Libya	or	Malaysia	or	Mauritius	or	Mexico	or	Montenegro	or	Namibia	or	Panama	or	Peru	or	Romania	or	Serbia	or	“South	Africa”	or	Thailand	or	Yugoslav	or	Macedonia	or	Tunisia	or	Turkey	or	Turkmenistan	or	Venezuela)	S14	 S8	OR	S9	OR	S10	OR	S11	OR	S12	OR	S13	S15	 AB	review*	OR	TI	review*	S16	 (MM	"Systematic	Review")	S17	 (MM	"Meta	Analysis")	S18	 S15	OR	S16	OR	S17	S19	 S7	AND	S14	AND	S18		 	Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 196		 Databases	 Econlit	1886	to	2017		Host	 OvidSP		Date	of	search	 1	December	2017	Years	covered	 1965	to	December	2017	Search	strategy	 1.				Developing	Countries.kw.		2.				(developing	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		3.			(under-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		4.			(less-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		5.			(third-world	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		6.			low	income	countr$.tw.		7.			middle	income	countr$.tw.		8.				or/1-7		9.			(Albania	or	Algeria	or	Angola	or	Argentina	or	Azerbaijan	or	Belarus	or	Bosnia	or	Botswana	or	Brazil	or	Bulgaria	or	China	or	Colombia	or	Costa	Rica	or	Cuba	or	Dominican	Republic	or	Ecuador	or	Gabon	or	Hungary	or	Iran	or	Iraq	or	Jamaica	or	Jordan	or	Kazakhstan	or	Lebanon	or	Libya	or	Malaysia	or	Mauritius	or	Mexico	or	Montenegro	or	Namibia	or	Panama	or	Peru	or	Romania	or	Serbia	or	South	Africa	or	Thailand	or	Yugoslav	or	Macedonia	or	Tunisia	or	Turkey	or	Turkmenistan	or	Venezuela).tw.			10.		(Armenia	or	Bolivia	or	Cameroon	or	Cape	Verde	or	Congo	or	Cote	d	Ivoire	or	Djibouti	or	Egypt	or	El	Salvador	or	Georgia	or	Ghana	or	Guatemala	or	Guyana	or	Honduras	or	Indonesia	or	Lesotho	or	Mauritania	or	Moldova	or	Morocco	or	Nicaragua	or	Nigeria	or	Pakistan	
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("cochrane	database	of	systematic	reviews"	or	evidence	report	technology	assessment	or	evidence	report	technology	assessment	summary).jn.	or	Evidence	Report:	Technology	Assessment*.jn.	or	((review	adj5	(rationale	or	evidence)).ti,ab.	and	review.pt.)	or	meta-analysis	as	topic/	or	Meta-Analysis.pt.		57		review$.ab.	58		review$.ti.	59		55	AND	(56	OR	57	OR	58)		Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 752		 Databases	 Ovid	MEDLINE(R)	
	Host	 OvidSP		Date	of	search	 1	December	2017	Years	covered	 1965	to	December	2017	Search	strategy	 1					Insurance,	Health/		2					Insurance,	Health,	Reimbursement/		3					Insurance,	Hospitalization/		4					Insurance,	Major	Medical/		5					Insurance,	Physician	Services/		6					Insurance,	Surgical/		7					Single-Payer	System/		8					exp	Insurance	Coverage/		9					health	insurance.ti.		10					(social	adj5	insurance$).tw.		11					(community	adj5	insurance$).tw.		12					(health	insurance	adj3	program$).tw.		13					universal	health	insuranc$.tw.		14					affordable	health	insuranc$.tw.		15					(health	insurance	adj3	scheme$).tw.		16					micro	health	insurance$.tw.		17					or/1-16		18					Developing	Countries/		19					(developing	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		20					(under-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		21					(less-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		22					(third-world	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		23					low	income	countr$.tw.		24					middle	income	countr$.tw.		25					or/18-24		26					exp	Africa/		27					exp	South	America/		28					exp	Central	America/		29					Mexico/		30					Latin	America/		31					exp	caribbean	region/		32					exp	Europe,	Eastern/		33					pacific	islands/		34					exp	melanesia/		35					exp	asia,	central/		36					exp	asia,	southeastern/		37					exp	asia,	western/		38					exp	china/		39					mongolia/		
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	Conference	 Proceedings	 Citation	 Index-	 Social	 Science	 &	 Humanities	 (CPCI-
SSH)		Host	 ISI	Web	of	Science		Date	of	search	 1	December	2017	Years	covered	 1965	to	December	2017	
		 282	
Search	strategy	 #1		 ts=("developing	countr*"	or	"developing	countr*"	or	"low	income	countr*"	or	"middle	income	countr*"	or	"under-developed	countr*"	or	"less-developed	countr*"	or	"third	world	countr*")	#2		 TS=(Bangladesh	or	Benin	or	“Burkina	Faso”	or	Burundi	or	“Central	African	Republic”	or	Chad	or	Comoros	or	Congo	or	Kongo	or	Eritrea	or	Ethiopia	or	Gambia	or	Guinea	or	“Guinea-Bissau”	or	Haiti	or	Kenya	or	Kyrgyz	or	Liberia	or	Madagascar	or	Malawi	or	Mali	or	Mozambique	or	Myanmar	or	Nepal	or	Niger	or	Rwanda	or	“Sierra	Leone”	or	Somalia	or	Tajikistan	or	Tanzania	or	Togo	or	Uganda	or	Zimbabwe)	#3		 TS=(	South	Sudan	or	Kiribati	or	Lao	or	Samoa	or	“Solomon	Islands”	or	“Timor	Leste”	or	Tuvalu	or	Vanuatu	or	Afghanistan	or	Bhutan)	#4		 TS=(Armenia	or	Bolivia	or	Cameroon	or	“Cape	Verde”	or	Congo	or	“Côte	d’Ivoire”	or	Djibouti	or	Egypt	or	“El	Salvador”	or	Georgia	or	Ghana	or	Guatemala	or	Guyana	or	Honduras	or	Indonesia	or	Lesotho	or	Mauritania	or	Moldova	or	Morocco	or	Nicaragua	or	Nigeria	or	Pakistan	or	“Papua	New	Guinea”	or	Paraguay	or	Philippines	or	“Sao	Tome	and	Principe”	or	Senegal	or	“Sri	Lanka”	or	Sudan	or	Syrian	or	Ukraine	or	Uzbekistan	or	Vietnam	or	Yemen	or	Zambia)	#5		 TS=(Albania	or	Algeria	or	Angola	or	Argentina	or	Azerbaijan	or	Belarus	or	“Bosnia	and	Herzegovina”	or	Botswana	or	Brazil	or	Bulgaria	or	China	or	Colombia	or	“Costa	Rica”	or	Cuba	or	“Dominican	Republic”	or	Ecuador	or	Gabon	or	Hungary	or	Iran	or	Iraq	or	Jamaica	or	Jordan	or	Kazakhstan	or	Lebanon	or	Libya	or	Malaysia	or	Mauritius	or	Mexico	or	Montenegro	or	Namibia	or	Panama	or	Peru	or	Romania	or	Serbia	or	“South	Africa”	or	Thailand	or	Yugoslav	or	Macedonia	or	Tunisia	or	Turkey	or	Turkmenistan	or	Venezuela)	#6		 ts=(social	same	"health	insurance"	)	#7		 ts=	(Community	SAME	"health	insurance")	#8		 ti="health	insurance"	#9		 ts=("health	insurance"	same	scheme*)	#10		 ts=("health	insurance"	same	program*)	#11		 ts="universal	health	insurance"	#12		 ts="affordable	health	insurance"	#13		 ts=(micro*	same	"health	insurance")	#14		 ts=(public	same	"health	insurance")	#15		 #6	or	#7	or	#8	or	#9	or	#10	or	#11	or	#12	or	#13	or	#14	#16		 #15	AND	(#1	OR	#2	OR	#3	OR	#4	OR	#5)	#17										TS=(	review*)	#18								 		#16	AND	#17		Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 284	
Table	A-2.	Search	strategies	for	the	updated	review	in	Chapter	5		 Databases	 CINAHL	Plus	Host	 EBSCO		Date	of	search	 8	September	2016	Years	covered	 January	2010	to	September	2016	Search	strategy	 S17								S15	AND	S16	S16								Limiters	to	2010-2016		S15								S7	AND	S14	S14								S8	OR	S9	OR	S10	OR	S11	OR	S12	OR	S13		S13	 	 TI	 (Albania	 or	 Algeria	 or	 Angola	 or	 Argentina	 or	 Azerbaijan	 or	Belarus	or	“Bosnia	and	Herzegovina”	or	Botswana	or	Brazil	or	Bulgaria	or	China	or	Colombia	or	“Costa	Rica”	or	Cuba	or	“Dominican	Republic”	or	Ecuador	or	Gabon	or	Hungary	or	 Iran	or	 Iraq	or	 Jamaica	or	 Jordan	or	Kazakhstan	or	Lebanon	or	Libya	or	Malaysia	or	Mauritius	or	Mexico	or	Montenegro	 or	 Namibia	 or	 Panama	 or	 Peru	 or	 Romania	 or	 Serbia	 or	“South	 Africa”	 or	 Thailand	 or	 Yugoslav	 or	 Macedonia	 or	 Tunisia	 or	Turkey	or	Turkmenistan	or	Venezuela	S12	TI	 (Armenia	or	Bolivia	or	Cameroon	or	 “Cape	Verde”	or	Congo	or	“Côte	d’Ivoire”	or	Djibouti	or	Egypt	or	“El	Savador”	or	Georgia	or	Ghana	or	 Guatemala	 or	 Guyana	 or	 Honduras	 or	 Indonesia	 or	 Lesotho	 or	Mauritania	or	Moldova	or	Lorocco	or	Nicaragua	or	Nigeria	or	Pakistan	or	“Papua	 New	 Guinea”	 or	 Paraguay	 or	 Phillippines	 or	 “Sao	 Tome	 and	Principe”	 or	 Senegal	 or	 “Sri	 Lanka”	 or	 Sudan	 or	 Syrian	 or	 Ukraine	 or	Uzbekistan	 or	 Vietnam	 or	 Yemen	 or	 Zambia)	S11	 TI	 (South	 Sudan	 or	Kiribati	or	Lao	or	Samoa	or	“Solomon	Islands”	or	“Timor	Leste”	or	Tuvalu	or	Vanuatu	or	Afghanistan	or	Bhutan)		S10	TI	(Bangladesh	or	Benin	or	“Burkina	Faso”	or	Burundi	or	“Central	African	Republic”	or	Chad	or	Comoros	or	Congo	or	Kongo	or	Eritrea	or	Ethiopia	or	Gambia	or	Guinea	or	 “Guinea-Bissau”	or	Haiti	or	Kenya	or	Kyrgyz	or	Liberia	or	Madagascar	or	Malawi	or	Mali	or	Mozambique	or	Myanmar	or	Nepal	or	Niger	or	Rwanda	or	“Sierra	Leone”	or	Somalia	or	Tajikistan	or	Tanzania	or	Togo	or	Uganda	or	Zimbabwe)		S9	(MM	"Developing	Countries")		S8	 ("developing	 countr*"	 or	 "developing	 countr*"	 or	 "low	 income	countr*"	or	 "middle	 income	 countr*"	or	 "under-developed	 countr*"	or	"less-developed	countr*"	or	"third	world	countr*")	S7	S1	OR	S2	OR	S3	OR	S4	OR	S5	OR	S6		S6	(MH	"Insurance,	Health,	Reimbursement+")		S5	(MH	"Insurance,	Health,	Reimbursement+")		S4	Health	insurance	S3	TI	health	insurance	S2	(MH	“Prospective	Payment	System+”)		S1	(MM	"Insurance,	Health+")	Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 839			 Databases	 Econlit	1886	to	September	2015,				Host	 OvidSP		Date	of	search	 8	September	2016	Years	covered	 2010	to	September	2016	Search	strategy	 1					Health	Insurance.kw.		2					health	insurance.ti.		3					(social	adj5	insurance$).tw.	4					(community	adj5	insurance$).tw.		5					(health	insurance	adj3	program$).tw.		6					universal	health	insuranc$.tw.		7					affordable	health	insuranc$.tw.		
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8					(health	insurance	adj3	scheme$).tw.	9					micro	health	insurance$.tw.	10			or/1-9		11				Developing	Countries.kw.		12				(developing	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		13			(under-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		14			(less-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		15			(third-world	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		16			low	income	countr$.tw.		17			middle	income	countr$.tw.		18				or/11-17		19			(Afghanistan	or	Guinea-Bisau	or	Rwanda	or	Bangladesh	or	Haiti	or	Senegal	or	Benin	or	Kenya	or	Sierra	Leone	or	Burkina	Faso	or	Korea	or	Somalia	or	Burundi	or	Kyrgyz	Republic	or	Tajikistan	or	Cambodia	or	Lao	or	Tanzania	or	Central	African	Republic	or	Liberia	or	Togo	or	Chad	or	Madagascar	or	Uganda	or	Comoros	or	Malawi	or	Uzbekistan	or	Congo	or	Mali	 or	 Vietnam	 or	 Eritrea	 or	 Mauritania	 or	 Yemen	 or	 Ethiopia	 or	Mozambique	or	Zambia	or	Gambia	or	Myanmar	or	Zimbabwe	or	Ghana	or	Nepal	or	Guinea	or	Niger).tw.		20					(Albania	or	Honduras	or	Paraguay	or	Angola	or	India	or	Philippines	or	Armenia	or	Indonesia	or	Samoa	or	Azerbaijan	or	Iran	or	Sao	Tome	or	Belize	or	 Iraq	or	Solomon	Islands	or	Bhutan	or	 Jordan	or	Sri	Lanka	or	Bolivia	or	Kiribati	or	Sudan	or	Cameroon	or	Kosovo	or	Swaziland	or	Cape	Verde	or	Lesotho	or	Syria$	or	China	or	Maldives	or	Thailand	or	Congo	or	Marshall	Islands	or	Timor-Leste).tw.		21					(Micronesia	or	Tonga	or	Djibouti	or	Moldova	or	Tunisia	or	Ecuador	or	 Mongolia	 or	 Turkmenistan	 or	 Egypt	 or	 Morocco	 or	 Ukraine	 or	 El	Salvador	 or	 Nicaragua	 or	 Vanuatu	 or	 Georgia	 or	 Nigeria	 or	 Gaza	 or	Guatemala	or	Pakistan	or	Guyana	or	Papua	New	Guinea	or	"West	Bank"	or	Cote	DIvoire).tw.		22	 	 	 	 	 (Algeria	 or	 Grenada	 or	 Peru	 or	 Samoa	 or	 Jamaica	 or	 Poland	 or	Argentina	 or	 Kazakhstan	 or	 Romania	 or	 Belarus	 or	 Latvia	 or	 Russian	Federation	or	Bosnia	or	Herzegovina	or	Lebanon	or	Serbia	or	Botswana	or	Libya	or	Seychelles	or	Brazil	or	Lithuania	or	South	Africa	or	Bulgaria	or	Macedonia	or	St	Kitts	or	Chile	or	Malaysia	or	St	Lucia	or	Colombia	or	Mauritius	 or	 St	 Vincent	 or	 Grenadines	 or	 Costa	 Rica	 or	 Mayotte	 or	Suriname	or	Cuba	or	Mexico	or	Turkey	or	Dominica	or	Montenegro	or	Uruguay	or	Dominican	Republic	or	Namibia	or	Venezuela	or	Fiji	or	Palau	or	Gabon	or	Panama).tw.		23					(afghanistan	or	africa	or	albania	or	algeria	or	angola	or	antigua	or	antilles	or	arab	countries	or	argentina	or	armenia	or	asia	or	asia	pacific	or	azerbaijan	or	balkans	or	bangladesh	or	belarus	or	belize	or	benin	or	bhutan	or	bolivia	or	bosnia	herzegovina	or	botswana	or	brazil	or	bulgaria	or	 burkina	 faso	or	burundi	 or	 cambodia	 or	 cameroon	or	 caribbean	or	central	africa	or	central	african	republic	or	central	america	or	central	asia	or	chile	or	china	or	colombia	or	congo	or	costa	rica	or	croatia	or	cuba).ct.		24	 	 	 	 	 ("democratic	 republic	 of	 the	 congo"	 or	 developing	 countries	 or	djibouti	 or	 dominica	 or	 dominican	 republic	 or	 e	 africa	 or	 e	 asia	 or	 e	europe	or	ecuador	or	egypt	or	el	salvador	or	eritrea	or	ethiopia	or	fiji	or	gabon	or	gambia	or	georgia	or	ghana	or	grenada	or	guatemala	or	guinea	or	guinea	bissau	or	guyana	or	haiti	or	honduras	or	india	or	indonesia	or	iran	or	iraq	or	ivory	coast	or	jamaica	or	jordan).ct.		25					(kazakhstan	or	kenya	or	kiribati	or	korea	or	kyrgyzstan	or	laos	or	latin	america	or	lebanon	or	lesotho	or	liberia	or	libya	or	macedonia	or	madagascar	or	maghreb	or	malawi	or	malaysia	or	maldives	or	mali	or	marshall	islands	or	martinique	or	mauritania	or	mauritius	or	melanesia	or	 mexico	 or	 micronesia	 or	 middle	 east	 or	 mongolia	 or	 morocco	 or	
		 285	
mozambique	or	myanmar	or	n	africa	or	n	korea	or	namibia	or	ne	asia	or	nepal	 or	 nicaragua	 or	 niger	 or	 nigeria	 or	 oceania	 or	 pacific	 islands	 or	pakistan	or	palestine	or	panama	or	papua	new	guinea	or	paraguay	or	peru	or	philippines	or	polynesia	or	puerto	rico).ct.		26					(syria	or	tajikistan	or	tanzania	or	thailand	or	timor	leste	or	tobago	or	togo	or	tonga	or	trinidad	or	"trinidad	and	tobago"	or	tunisia	or	turkey	or	turkmenistan	or	uganda	or	ukraine	or	uruguay	or	ussr	or	uzbekistan	or	vanuatu	or	venezuela	or	vietnam	or	w	africa	or	w	indies	or	yemen	or	zambia	or	zimbabwe).ct.		27					(africa	or	asia	or	"latin	america	and	the	caribbean").gr.		28					or/19-27		29					18	or	28		30					10	and	29		31					Limit	30	to	yr	=”2010-Current”		Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 486	records			 Databases	 Embase	1974	to	2016	September,				Host	 OvidSP		Date	of	search	 8	September	2016	Years	covered	 2010	to	September	2016	Search	strategy	 1					Social	Insurance/		2					Public	Health	Insurance/		3					National	Health	Insurance/	4					health	insurance.ti.		5					(social	adj5	insurance$).tw.		6					(community	adj5	insurance$).tw.		7					(health	insurance	adj3	program$).tw.		8					universal	health	insuranc$.tw.		9					affordable	health	insuranc$.tw.		10					(health	insurance	adj3	scheme$).tw.		11					micro	health	insurance$.tw.		12					or/1-11		13					Developing	country/		14					(developing	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		15					(under-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		16					(less-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		17					(third-world	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		18					low	income	countr$.tw.		19					middle	income	countr$.tw.		20					or/13-19	20					exp	Africa/		21					exp	"South	and	Central	America"/		22					Mexico/		23					exp	Caribbean	Islands/		24					exp	Eastern	Europe/		25					exp	Pacific	islands/		26					exp	Southeast	Asia/		27					exp	south	asia/		28					middle	east/		29					china/	30					korea/	31					mongolia/		
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32					philippines/		33					taiwan/		34					iran/		35					iraq/		36					jordan/		37					lebanon/		38					palestine/		39					syrian	arab	republic/		40					"turkey	(republic)"/		41					yemen/		42					asia/		43					kazakhstan/		44					kyrgyzstan/		45					tajikistan/		46					turkmenistan/		47					uzbekistan/		48					exp	Indian	Ocean/		49					(Afghanistan	or	Guinea-Bisau	or	Rwanda	or	Bangladesh	or	Haiti	or	Senegal	or	Benin	or	Kenya	or	Sierra	Leone	or	Burkina	Faso	or	Korea	or	Somalia	or	Burundi	or	Kyrgyz	Republic	or	Tajikistan	or	Cambodia	or	Lao	or	Tanzania	or	Central	African	Republic	or	Liberia	or	Togo	or	Chad	or	Madagascar	or	Uganda	or	Comoros	or	Malawi	or	Uzbekistan	or	Congo	or	Mali	 or	 Vietnam	 or	 Eritrea	 or	 Mauritania	 or	 Yemen	 or	 Ethiopia	 or	Mozambique	or	Zambia	or	Gambia	or	Myanmar	or	Zimbabwe	or	Ghana	or	Nepal	or	Guinea	or	Niger).tw.		50					(Albania	or	Honduras	or	Paraguay	or	Angola	or	India	or	Philippines	or	Armenia	or	Indonesia	or	Samoa	or	Azerbaijan	or	Iran	or	Sao	Tome	or	Belize	or	 Iraq	or	Solomon	Islands	or	Bhutan	or	 Jordan	or	Sri	Lanka	or	Bolivia	or	Kiribati	or	Sudan	or	Cameroon	or	Kosovo	or	Swaziland	or	Cape	Verde	or	Lesotho	or	Syria$	or	China	or	Maldives	or	Thailand	or	Congo	or	Marshall	Islands	or	Timor-Leste).tw.		51					(Micronesia	or	Tonga	or	Djibouti	or	Moldova	or	Tunisia	or	Ecuador	or	 Mongolia	 or	 Turkmenistan	 or	 Egypt	 or	 Morocco	 or	 Ukraine	 or	 El	Salvador	 or	 Nicaragua	 or	 Vanuatu	 or	 Georgia	 or	 Nigeria	 or	 Gaza	 or	Guatemala	or	Pakistan	or	Guyana	or	Papua	New	Guinea	or	"West	Bank"	or	Cote	DIvoire).tw.		52	 	 	 	 	 (Algeria	 or	 Grenada	 or	 Peru	 or	 Samoa	 or	 Jamaica	 or	 Poland	 or	Argentina	 or	 Kazakhstan	 or	 Romania	 or	 Belarus	 or	 Latvia	 or	 Russian	Federation	or	Bosnia	or	Herzegovina	or	Lebanon	or	Serbia	or	Botswana	or	Libya	or	Seychelles	or	Brazil	or	Lithuania	or	South	Africa	or	Bulgaria	or	Macedonia	or	St	Kitts	or	Chile	or	Malaysia	or	St	Lucia	or	Colombia	or	Mauritius	 or	 St	 Vincent	 or	 Grenadines	 or	 Costa	 Rica	 or	 Mayotte	 or	Suriname	or	Cuba	or	Mexico	or	Turkey	or	Dominica	or	Montenegro	or	Uruguay	or	Dominican	Republic	or	Namibia	or	Venezuela	or	Fiji	or	Palau	or	Gabon	or	Panama).tw.		53					or/12-52		54					or/1-11		55					53	and	54		56					limit	55	to	yr="2010	-Current"		Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 3913	records			 Databases	 Ovid	MEDLINE(R)			
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Host	 OvidSP		Date	of	search	 8	September	2016	Years	covered	 January	2010	to	September	2016	Search	strategy	 1					Insurance,	Health/		2					Insurance,	Health,	Reimbursement/		3					Insurance,	Hospitalization/		4					Insurance,	Major	Medical/		5					Insurance,	Physician	Services/		6					Insurance,	Surgical/		7					Single-Payer	System/		8					exp	Insurance	Coverage/		9					health	insurance.ti.		10					(social	adj5	insurance$).tw.		11					(community	adj5	insurance$).tw.		12					(health	insurance	adj3	program$).tw.		13					universal	health	insuranc$.tw.		14					affordable	health	insuranc$.tw.		15					(health	insurance	adj3	scheme$).tw.		16					micro	health	insurance$.tw.		17					or/1-16		18					Developing	Countries/		19					(developing	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		20					(under-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		21					(less-developed	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		22					(third-world	adj3	(countr$	or	nation	or	nations)).tw.		23					low	income	countr$.tw.		24					middle	income	countr$.tw.		25					or/18-24		26					exp	Africa/		27					exp	South	America/		28					exp	Central	America/		29					Mexico/		30					Latin	America/		31					exp	caribbean	region/		32					exp	Europe,	Eastern/		33					pacific	islands/		34					exp	melanesia/		35					exp	asia,	central/		36					exp	asia,	southeastern/		37					exp	asia,	western/		38					exp	china/		39					mongolia/		40					exp	indian	ocean	islands/		41					or/25-40		42					(Afghanistan	or	Guinea-Bisau	or	Rwanda	or	Bangladesh	or	Haiti	or	Senegal	or	Benin	or	Kenya	or	Sierra	Leone	or	Burkina	Faso	or	Korea	or	Somalia	or	Burundi	or	Kyrgyz	Republic	or	Tajikistan	or	Cambodia	or	Lao	or	Tanzania	or	Central	African	Republic	or	Liberia	or	Togo	or	Chad	or	Madagascar	or	Uganda	or	Comoros	or	Malawi	or	Uzbekistan	or	Congo	or	Mali	 or	 Vietnam	 or	 Eritrea	 or	 Mauritania	 or	 Yemen	 or	 Ethiopia	 or	Mozambique	or	Zambia	or	Gambia	or	Myanmar	or	Zimbabwe	or	Ghana	or	Nepal	or	Guinea	or	Niger).tw.		43					(Albania	or	Honduras	or	Paraguay	or	Angola	or	India	or	Philippines	or	Armenia	or	Indonesia	or	Samoa	or	Azerbaijan	or	Iran	or	Sao	Tome	or	Belize	or	 Iraq	or	Solomon	Islands	or	Bhutan	or	 Jordan	or	Sri	Lanka	or	Bolivia	or	Kiribati	or	Sudan	or	Cameroon	or	Kosovo	or	Swaziland	or	Cape	
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	Conference	 Proceedings	 Citation	 Index-	 Social	 Science	 &	
Humanities	(CPCI-SSH)		Host	 ISI	Web	of	Science		Date	of	search	 8	September	2016	Years	covered	 January	2010	to	September	2016	Search	strategy	 #21		 #16	or	#17	or	#18	or	#19	or	#20	#20		 #15	AND	#5	#19		 #15	AND	#4	#18		 #15	AND	#3	#17		 #15	AND	#2	#16		 #15	AND	#1	#15		 #6	or	#7	or	#8	or	#9	or	#10	or	#11	or	#12	or	#13	or	#14	#14		 ts=(public	same	"health	insurance")	#13		 ts=(micro*	same	"health	insurance")	#12		 ts="affordable	health	insurance"	#11		 ts="universal	health	insurance"	#10		 ts=("health	insurance"	same	program*)	#9		 ts=("health	insurance"	same	scheme*)	#8		 ti="health	insurance"	#7		 ts=	(Community	SAME	"health	insurance")	#6		 ts=(social	same	"health	insurance"	)	#5		 TS=(Algeria	or	Grenada	or	Peru	or	Samoa	or	Jamaica	or	Poland	or	Argentina	or	Kazakhstan	or	Romania	or	Belarus	or	Latvia	or	Russia	or	Bosnia	 or	Herzegovina	 or	 Lebanon	 or	 Serbia	 or	 Botswana	 or	 Libya	 or	Seychelles	or	Brazil	or	Lithuania	or	Africa	or	Bulgaria	or	Macedonia	or	"St	Kitts"	or	Chile	or	Malaysia	or	"St	Lucia"	or	Colombia	or	Mauritius	or	"St	Vincent"	or	Grenadines	or	"Costa	Rica"	or	Mayotte	or	Suriname	or	Cuba	
		 289	
or	 Mexico	 or	 Turkey	 or	 Dominica	 or	 Montenegro	 or	 Uruguay	 or	"Dominican	Republic"	or	Namibia	or	Venezuela	or	Fiji	or	Palau	or	Gabon	or	Panama)	#4		 TS=(Albania	 or	 Honduras	 or	 Paraguay	 or	 Angola	 or	 India	 or	Philippines	or	Armenia	or	Indonesia	or	Samoa	or	Azerbaijan	or	Iran	or	"Sao	Tome"	or	Belize	or	Iraq	or	"Solomon	Islands"	or	Bhutan	or	Jordan	or	"Sri	 Lanka"	 or	Bolivia	 or	Kiribati	 or	 Sudan	 or	 Cameroon	 or	Kosovo	 or	Swaziland	or	"Cape	Verde"	or	Lesotho	or	Syria*	or	China	or	Maldives	or	Thailand	or	Congo	or	"Marshall	Islands"	or	Timor-Leste)	#3		 TS=(Micronesia	or	Tonga	or	Djibouti	or	Moldova	or	Tunisia	or	Ecuador	or	Mongolia	or	Turkmenistan	or	Egypt	or	Morocco	or	Ukraine	or	"El	Salvador"	or	Nicaragua	or	Vanuatu	or	Georgia	or	Nigeria	or	Gaza	or	Guatemala	or	Pakistan	or	Guyana	or	"Papua	New	Guinea"	or	"West	Bank"	or	Cote	DIvoire)	#2		 TS=(Afghanistan	 or	 Guinea-Bisau	 or	 Rwanda	 or	 Bangladesh	 or	Haiti	or	Senegal	or	Benin	or	Kenya	or	"Sierra	Leone"	or	"Burkina	Faso"	or	Korea	or	Somalia	or	Burundi	or	Kyrgyz	or	Tajikistan	or	Cambodia	or	Lao	or	Tanzania	or	"Central	African	Republic"	or	Liberia	or	Togo	or	Chad	or	Madagascar	or	Uganda	or	Comoros	or	Malawi	or	Uzbekistan	or	Congo	or	Mali	 or	 Vietnam	 or	 Eritrea	 or	 Mauritania	 or	 Yemen	 or	 Ethiopia	 or	Mozambique	or	Zambia	or	Gambia	or	Myanmar	or	Zimbabwe	or	Ghana	or	Nepal	or	Guinea	or	Niger)	#1		 TS=("developing	 countr*"	 or	 "developing	 countr*"	 or	 "low	income	 countr*"	 or	 "middle	 income	 countr*"	 or	 "under-developed	countr*"	or	"less-developed	countr*"	or	"third	world	countr*")		Language	restrictions	 None	Number	of	citations	 1313	records					 	
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Question	1.	Have	different	methods	been	compared	within	the	study?		It	is	reasonable	for	any	study	attempting	to	estimate	treatment	effects	to	implement	a	number	of	methods	based	on	different	assumptions.	This	could	be	used	to	gauge	the	sensitivity	of	 the	 results	 to	 the	 assumptions	underpinning	 the	models.	At	 the	 same	time,	 adopting	 a	 number	 of	 approaches	 forces	 the	 analyst	 to	 think	 about	 the	assumptions	embedded	in	each	of	the	methods	and	their	plausibility	and	helps	focus	on	 those	 of	 most	 importance.	 However,	 different	 methods	 might	 be	 estimating	different	treatment	parameters	and	therefore	different	numerical	parameters	might	be	the	result	of	this.	The	possible	answers	to	the	above	question	are	as	follows:		(a)	Yes		Results	 from	methods	which	 assume	 selection	 on	 observables	 are	 contrasted	with	other	methods,	including	those	assuming	selection	on	unobservables.		(b)	Partially		Results	from	different	methods	are	contrasted	but	all	the	methods	rely	on	the	same	assumption	 about	 selection,	 either	 selection	 on	 observables	 or	 selection	 on	unobservables.		(c)	No.			
Question	2.	Have	the	results	of	the	study	been	compared	to	others	in	the	literature?		Similar	to	Question	1	above,	a	study	should	compare	its	results	to	those	found	in	the	literature.	Given	that	they	would	relate	to	different	methods	and/or	different	datasets,	one	 would	 expect	 differences	 in	 the	 results	 but	 consistency	 between	 them	 (or	inconsistencies	 that	 are	 easily	 explained)	 will	 give	 credibility	 to	 the	 results.	 The	possible	answers	here	are:		(a)	Yes,	compared	to	alternative	methods	using	the	same	dataset.		(b)	Yes,	compared	to	similar	methods	using	other	data	sources.		(c)	 Not	 compared	 –	 no	 other	 estimates	 found	 in	 the	 literature.	 This	 option	should	 be	 selected	when	 there	 is	 an	 indication	 that	 a	 search	was	 conducted	 in	 the	literature	but	no	other	related	estimates	were	found.		(d)	Not	compared.			
Question	3.	Is	there	a	discussion	of	what	treatment	effect	is	identified	and	of	the	
assumptions	needed?		Usually	the	parameter	of	interest	in	economic	evaluations	for	NICE	is	the	ATE	but	in	some	cases	it	might	be	the	ATT.	The	parameter	of	interest	in	the	analysis	should	match	the	parameter	of	interest	in	the	economic	evaluation.	In	Section	2,	the	different	types	of	 treatment	 effects	 that	 can	 be	 identified	were	 discussed	 and	were	 related	 to	 the	different	approaches	and	their	assumptions.	Any	study	should	show	an	awareness	of	this	issue.	For	example,	if	one	is	willing	to	make	the	assumption	of	homogeneity	in	the	treatment	effect,	then	it	is	straightforward	to	identify	the	ATE.	With	heterogeneity,	the	ATT	might	be	identified	under	weak	assumptions.	However,	the	ATE	may	need	a	much	more	stringent	set	of	assumptions.	If	the	parameter	of	interest	is	the	ATT,	this	is	not	a	problem.	A	good	study	should	justify	how	the	estimated	treatment	effect	related	to	the	treatment	 effect	 of	 interest,	 together	 with	 their	 underpinning	 assumptions.	 The	possible	options	to	be	selected	are	as	follows:		
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(a)	Discussion	of	effect	and	assumptions.		(b)	Discussion	of	effect	but	not	the	assumptions.		(c)	Discussion	of	the	assumptions	but	not	the	effect.		(d)	No	discussion	of	either.			
Question	4:	 Is	 the	model	chosen	consistent	with	the	outcome	variable	 if	using	a	
parametric	method?		The	 distribution	 of	 the	 outcome	 variable	 should	 inform	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 type	 of	regression	model	 to	use.	 For	 example	probit/logit	models	 can	be	used	with	binary	outcomes,	 generalised	 linear	models	 can	 be	 very	 useful	 in	 cases	where	 the	 data	 is	highly	skewed,	etc.	The	possible	options	to	be	selected	are	as	follows:		(a)	Yes		(b)	Unclear		(c)	No			
Question	5:	Were	any	checks	conducted	on	the	model	specification?		Specification	checks	should	be	conducted	on	the	models.	The	appropriate	checks	will	depend	 on	 the	model	 used.	 For	 example	 linear	 regression	models	 can	 be	 assessed	using	 plots	 of	 the	 residuals	 or	 more	 formally	 using	 misspecification,	heteroskedasticity,	 autocorrelation,	 normality,	 etc.	 tests	 based	 on	 the	 residuals;	 if	using	 kernel	 regression	 or	matching	 it	 is	 important	 to	 check	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 the	results	 to	 the	 choice	 of	 bandwidth	 and	 matching	 algorithm	 respectively	 (see	Wooldridge,	Jones	and	Rice,	Kreif	et	al.14,15,57).	The	possible	options	to	be	selected	are	as	follows:		(a)	Yes,	appropriate	(detail	which)		(b)	Yes,	but	inappropriate	or	not	enough		(c)	No	checks	reported			
Methods	assuming	selection	on	observables	(Questions	6-8)		
Question	6.	On	selection:	Is	the	assumption	of	selection	on	observables	assessed?		The	methods	presented	in	Section	2.2	are	based	on	the	assumption	that	selection	is	on	observables.	Strictly	speaking,	selection	is	on	both	observables	and	unobservables	but	the	unobservables	are	not	correlated	with	the	outcomes	and	thus,	their	presence	does	not	induce	confounding.	This	assumption	is	often	controversial	and	cannot	be	tested	directly	although	placebo	tests	can	sometimes	be	used.	A	convincing	argument	should	put	 forward	 to	 substantiate	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 selected	variables	are	 sufficient	and,	once	used	in	the	analysis,	there	are	no	remaining	unobserved	variables	affecting	both	the	treatment	and	the	outcome.	The	following	options	are	available:		(a)	 Yes,	 expert	 literature/opinion	 cited.	 The	 analyst	 justifies	 the	 assumption	with	reference	to	a	priori	knowledge	in	the	expert	literature	or	if	this	is	lacking	with	reference	 to	 expert	 opinion.	 Sometimes	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 assess	 this	 assumption	indirectly	by	testing	if	a	treatment	effect	is	zero	when	it	is	known	that	it	is.	For	example,	if	 there	 is	 access	 to	 two	different	 control	 groups,	 one	 can	 check	 that	 the	 treatment	effect	is	zero	between	the	two	groups	or	one	can	use	a	variable	known	not	to	have	an	effect	to	estimate	the	treatment	effect.		(b)	Yes,	theoretical	reasoning	given.	The	analyst	justifies	the	assumption	with	a	sensible	theoretical	argument	but	does	not	refer	to	the	literature.		(c)	No.			
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Question	7.	What	checks	were	conducted	to	assess	overlap?		All	 methods	 assuming	 selection	 on	 unobservables	 rely	 on	 good	 overlap	 in	 the	distribution	 of	 the	 covariates	 between	 the	 treatment	 and	 control	 groups.	 Even	 if	ignorability	holds,	 the	results	will	be	suspect	 if	 there	is	 lack	of	overlap	between	the	treatment	 and	 control	 groups.	 Lack	 of	 overlap	 implies	 that	 regression	 estimates	extrapolate	 to	 regions	well	 outside	 the	 sample,	might	 cause	 instability	 in	 estimates	using	IPW	and	call	into	question	matching	estimates	of	the	average	treatment	effect	as	it	will	not	be	possible	to	find	matches	for	some	individuals.		(a)	Yes,	thorough	checks.	As	a	starting	point,	it	is	useful	to	report	normalised	differences	in	covariates	for	the	treatment	and	the	control	groups	to	check	if	overlap	is	 a	 problem.	Normalised	differences	 above	0.25	have	been	 suggested	 as	 signalling	problems	with	overlap.	It	is	important	to	emphasise	that	normalised	differences	are	different	from	the	usual	t-statistics	of	the	difference	in	means	between	the	treatment	and	 control	 groups.	 Looking	 at	 one	 covariate	 at	 a	 time	 and	 focusing	 only	 on	 one	moment	 (the	mean)	 in	 its	 distribution	 is	 insufficient.	 Other	more	 thorough	 checks	include	comparing	histograms	or	kernel	plots	of	the	covariates	for	the	treatment	and	the	control	groups,	quantile-quantile	(QQ)	plots,	higher	moments	and	cross	moments	of	 covariate	 distributions.	 If	 there	 are	 many	 covariates	 or	 the	 propensity	 score	 is	estimated	as	part	of	the	model,	a	better	alternative	is	to	present	distributions	of	the	propensity	score	by	treatment	group	because	we	are	trying	to	assess	if	there	are	any	areas	where	the	density	of	the	covariates	is	zero	for	one	group	and	non-zero	for	the	other.	Note	that	the	overlap	in	the	covariates	will	most	likely	be	assessed	as	part	of	a	nonparametric	regression	method	for	example.		(b)	Yes,	minimum	checks.	These	include	normalised	differences	at	the	very	least	and	perhaps	some	but	not	all	of	the	additional	checks	reported	in	(a).		(c)	No	checks	reported.			
Question	 8:	 Has	 balancing	 of	 the	 covariates	 been	 checked	 after	 matching	 and	
propensity	score	methods?		Matching	and	propensity	score	methods	should	achieve	balancing	of	the	covariates.		(a)	 Yes,	 minimum	 checks.	 The	 analyst	 can	 use	 normalised	 differences	appropriate	for	each	methods	in	covariates	for	the	treatment	and	the	control	groups	or	weighted	normalised	differences	in	the	case	of	IPW	as	in	Austin.45		(b)	Yes,	more	thorough	checks.	Other	more	thorough	checks	include	comparing	histograms	or	kernel	plots	of	the	covariates	for	the	treatment	and	the	control	groups,	or	if	matching	on	the	propensity	score	comparing	distributions	of	the	propensity	score	by	treatment.		(c)	No	checks	reported.			
Methods	using	the	propensity	score	(Questions	9-10)		
Question	9:	Is	the	propensity	score	function	sufficiently	flexible?		It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 the	 propensity	 score	 function	 needs	 to	 be	 sufficiently	flexible	and	therefore	should	include	not	just	the	variables	in	levels	but	also	squares	and	interactions.	Clearly,	the	flexibility	will	depend	on	the	size	of	the	dataset.	One	can	also	use	semiparametric/non-parametric	functions	to	model	the	propensity	score.	The	available	choices	for	this	question	are:		(a)	Yes,	includes	interactions	or	different	functions	of	the	covariates		(b)	Yes,	flexible	due	to	semiparametric/non-parametric	specification		(c)	Unlikely	to	be	flexible	enough		(d)	Unclear	or	not	reported		
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Question	10:	Are	potential	IVs	excluded	from	the	set	of	conditioning	variables?		Variables	 that	 should	 be	 included	 in	 the	 conditioning	 set	 are	 variables	 measured	before	 the	assignment	 to	 treatment	 takes	place,	 including	past	outcomes.	Variables	that	are	potential	IVs	should	not	be	included	because	they	have	been	shown	to	increase	the	bias	in	matching	type	estimators	unless	they	are	exogenous.	Even	in	this	case,	when	they	do	not	cause	a	bias,	they	will	increase	the	asymptotic	variance	of	the	estimate.	The	available	choices	are:		(a)	Yes		(b)	Some	variables	might	present	a	problem		(c)	IV	clearly	included			
Matching	methods	(Questions	11-14)		
Question	11:	Are	there	data	quality	issues?		An	 important	 issue	 in	matching	 is	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 data.	 For	 the	 treatment	 effect	calculated	using	matching	to	be	convincing,	the	data	and	the	definitions	for	the	treated	and	 control	 groups	 must	 be	 comparable.	 The	 assumption	 of	 no	 unobserved	confounders	 remaining	 which	 affect	 both	 the	 treatment	 and	 the	 outcome	 is	 more	compelling	 if	 the	 treated	and	controls	come	from	the	same,	or	at	 least	very	similar,	environment.	It	is	also	important	that	the	dataset	includes	a	good	number	of	variables	that	can	be	used	for	matching	and	that	the	sample	sizes	before	matching	are	big	enough	so	there	are	plenty	of	potential	matches.	Accordingly,	the	following	subcategories	are	available:		(a)	 Data	 and	 definitions	 comparable	 for	 treated	 and	 control	 groups:	Yes/No/Unclear	or	not	reported.		(b)	 Treated	 and	 control	 come	 from	 the	 same	 area	 or	 environment:	Yes/No/Unclear	or	not	reported.		(c)	Rich	set	of	variables:	Yes,	available	and	used/Not	available	or	not	used.		(d)	Reasonable	sample	sizes:	Yes,	likely/	No.		
Question	 12:	 For	 Nearest	 Neighbour	 matching:	 Has	 bias	 adjustment	 been	
conducted	if	more	than	one	variable	was	included?		Abadie	and	Imbens61,62	showed	that	the	estimator	obtained	using	Nearest	Neighbour	matching	is	biased	if	matching	on	more	than	one	continuous	covariate	and	proposed	a	bias	adjustment.	 Imbens	and	Wooldrige13	highlight	 the	cases	under	which	 the	bias	will	be	small	in	practice.		(a)	Yes		(b)	No			
Question	13:	Is	the	choice	of	replacement	(with/without)	reasonable?		Matching	without	replacement	if	the	control	group	is	small	might	result	in	bad	matches	which	increase	the	bias	of	the	estimator.	Matching	with	replacement	might	result	in	the	same	individuals	in	the	control	group	being	matched	to	in	areas	of	the	propensity	score	where	there	are	many	more	treated	observations	than	controls.	This	means	that	some	untreated	individuals	may	be	matched	repeatedly.	One	of	the	following	options	should	be	selected:		(a)	Yes		(b)	Likely		(c)	No			
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Question	 14:	 Is	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 number	 of	 matches/caliper	 matching/radius	
matching	reasonable?		There	is	a	trade-off	between	bias	and	variance	which	the	analyst	needs	to	take	into	account.	Note	that	this	is	a	subjective	decision	and	there	is	not	much	known	about,	for	example,	how	to	select	the	number	of	matches.		(a)	Yes		(b)	Likely		(c)	No		
IV	methods	(Questions	15-18)		
Question	15:	Is	the	instrument	well	justified?		An	IV	variable	needs	to	affect	the	treatment	directly	but	the	outcome	only	indirectly	through	 its	 effect	 on	 the	 treatment.	 This	 exclusion	 restriction	 is	 key	 but	 cannot	 be	tested	directly.	If	there	is	more	than	one	IV,	one	can	test	over-identifying	restrictions	(see	Question	17)	but	in	most	cases	one	needs	to	rely	on	the	published	literature	and	expert	opinion.		(a)	Yes,	theoretically		(b)	Yes,	citing	expert	literature		(c)	No			
Question	16:	Is	the	sample	size	relatively	large?		IV	methods	 are	 biased	 on	 finite	 samples	 but	 they	 are	 consistent	 in	 large	 samples.	Therefore	it	is	important	that	they	are	used	in	relatively	large	datasets.		(a)	Yes		(b)	No			
Question	 17:	 If	 more	 than	 one	 IV,	 is	 the	 test	 of	 over-identifying	 restrictions	
reported?		A	 test	of	over-identifying	restrictions	 is	essentially	a	 test	of	 instrument	validity	and	should	be	reported	whenever	there	are	more	instruments	than	endogenous	variables.	If	the	number	of	endogenous	variables	is	the	same	as	the	number	of	instruments,	one	can	always	create	additional	instruments	by	interacting	the	IV	with	other	covariates	in	the	 model.	 Note	 that	 rejection	 of	 the	 hypothesis	 could	 be	 due	 to	 a	 failure	 of	 the	instrument	but	also	to	model	misspecification.		(a)	Yes		(b)	No			
Question	18:	Is	a	weak	instrument(s)	test	reported?		Weak	instruments	lead	to	an	increase	in	the	bias	of	the	estimator.	Simple	correlations	or	partial	correlations	can	be	used	in	the	first	instance.	More	formal	tests	such	as	that	reported	in	Cragg	and	Donald63	could	also	be	used.		(a)	Yes		(b)	No		
Difference	in	Differences	(Questions	20-23)		The	 following	 sets	 of	 questions	 relate	 to	 assumptions	 that	 are	 untestable	 and	 it	 is	therefore	 important	 that	 the	 analyst	 justifies	 them	with	 reference	 to	 the	 published	literature	or	expert	opinion.			
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Question	20:	Does	the	intervention	generate	exogenous	variation?	(not	applicable	
if	natural	experiment)		The	 DiD	 approach	 makes	 use	 of	 interventions	 or	 events	 which	 induce	 random	assignment	of	the	individual	to	the	treatment	and	control	groups	or	at	least	random	eligibility.	This	is	similar	to	the	exogenous	variation	in	the	treatment	variable	achieved	by	randomisation.	In	general,	this	is	not	applicable	for	natural	experiments	although	it	is	 always	 appropriate	 to	 assess	 if	 the	 natural	 experiment	 generated	 exogenous	variation.		(a)	Yes,	highly	likely		(b)	Unlikely		(c)	Not	applicable			
Question	21:	Is	the	assumption	of	common	trends	across	groups	reasonable?		Differential	 trends	might	arise	 if	 for	example,	 the	 treatment	and	control	groups	are	based	in	different	areas	with	different	trends	in	the	outcomes,	or	when	external	shocks	to	 the	outcome	happen	at	different	 time	points.	The	differential	 trend	adjusted	DID	estimator	can	be	used	is	the	trends	might	not	be	the	same	and	the	analyst	has	access	to	historical	data	(see	Section	2.5.1).		(a)	Yes,	highly	likely		(b)	Unlikely			
Question	22:	Is	 it	reasonable	to	assume	that	there	is	no	selection	of	unobserved	
temporary	individual	specific	shocks?		This	 question	 relates	 to	 the	 Ashenfelter’s	 dip	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section.	 If	individuals	are	able	to	change	their	behaviour	before	the	timing	of	the	treatment	to	manipulate	their	probability	of	getting	the	treatment,	the	DID	method	will	not	be	able	to	identify	the	correct	treatment	effect.		(a)	Yes,	highly	likely		(b)	Unlikely		
Question	23:	Is	the	assumption	of	no	systematic	composition	changes	within	each	
group	reasonable?	(applicable	with	repeated	cross-sections,	not	with	longitudinal	
data)		The	DiD	method	 is	 able	 to	 remove	 the	unobserved	 individual	 effect	using	 repeated	cross-sections	 only	 if	 there	 are	 no	 composition	 changes	 in	 the	 groups	 so	 that	 the	average	unobserved	individual	effect	remains	the	same	before	and	after	the	treatment	or	intervention.		(a)	Yes,	highly	likely		(b)	Unlikely		(c)	Not	applicable			
Regression	Discontinuity	Design	(Questions	24-25)		
Question	24:	Is	the	sample	size	relatively	large?		In	 common	with	 IV	methods,	 the	 regression	 discontinuity	 design	 identifies	 a	 local	parameter	and	therefore	the	estimates	may	not	be	very	precise	if	the	sample	size	is	small.		(a)	Yes		(b)	No			
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Question	 25:	 Is	 the	 assumption	 that	 individuals	 are	 not	 able	 to	 affect	 the	
instrument	to	change	the	likelihood	of	participation	reasonable?		The	regression	discontinuity	design	will	in	general	not	be	able	to	identify	the	required	treatment	 effect	 if	 individuals	 are	 able	 to	 manipulate	 the	 instrument	 to	increase/decrease	their	likelihood	of	participation.	In	this	case,	individuals	below	and	above	the	threshold	are	different	in	terms	of	the	unobservables.		(a)	Yes		(b)	No	
Table	A-4	Summary	of	all	included	studies	(N	=	68)	
ID	 Study	 Type	of	Study		 QUEENS	 GRADE	 Utilisation	 Financial	Protection		 Health	Outcomes	
1	 Babiarz	et	al	(2010).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
Difference	in	difference	(DID).	Data:	Household	Survey.	N=6,201	

























3	 Medium	 		 		 Being	confined	in	an	intervention	hospital	decreases	the	likelihood	of	being	CRP-positive	and	being	wasted	by	4	and	9	percentage	points.	Patients	in	the	intervention	are	12	%	and	9	%	more	likely	to	have	health	improvement	for	not	wasted	and	CRP-negative	respectively.		
8	 Sepehri	et	al.	(2011).	Country:	Vietnam.	Scheme:	CBHI	
Fixed	and	random	effect.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=6,037	































































1	 Low	 	 SP	reduces	the	likelihood	of	HE	in	3.6	and	7.1%	in	households	with	patients	diagnosed	with	DM	and/or	hypertension,	respectively	 		
24	 Camacho	and	Conover	(2013).	Country:	Colombia.	Scheme:	SHI	
RD.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=40,931	
3	 Low	 		 	 The	Subsidized	Regime	had	a	significant	and	positive	effect	on	health,	reducing	the	incidence	of	low	birth	weight	between	1.7	and	3.8	percentage	points.	We	find	that	the	direction	of	the	impact	on	very	low	birth	weight,	an	indicator	for	the	baby	being	preterm,	and	for	5-minute	Apgar	score	show	an	improvement	in	newborn	health,	but	these	results	are	not	always	significant	
25	 Cheung	and	Padieu	(2013).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	















































































2	 Low	 	 		 The	risk	of	a	child	dying	in	the	first	month	of	life	is	reduced	by	close	to	5	out	of	1,000	(or	0.5%)	for	the	population	at	large	and	by	around	7	out	of	1,000	(0.7%)	for	the	program’s	target	population.	




































































1	 Low	 	 	 For	the	target	population,	a	one	percentage	point	increase	in	eligibility	is	found	to	decrease	miscarriages	by	.04	percentage	point	at	the	average	
60	 Yang	and	Wu	(2015).	Country:	China.	Scheme:	SHI	
2PM;	PSM	and	DID;	Heckman	Selection	model.	Data:	Household	survey.	N=4084	



























2	 Low	 	 	 NCMS	does	significantly	decrease	children’s	malnutrition	probability	by	6.5	%	points.	The	OLS	estimations	show	that	the	average	3-day	food	consumption	of	women	at	child-bearing	age	increases	by	261	calories	after	enrolling	in	the	NCMS.		
67	 Raza	et	al.	(2016).	Country:	India.	Scheme:	CBHI	
IV.	Data:	Randomised	study.	N=21,372	









Table	A-5	Rosenbaum	bounds	analysis	for	the	JKN	Contributory	group	(Chapter	7)		 Any	Outpatient	 	 #	visit	(total)	 	 #	visit	(Public)	 	 #	visit	(Private)	 Any	Inpatient	 	 #	visit	(total)	 	 #	visit	(Public)	 	 #	visit	(Private)	Gamma	 P+	 P-	 	 P+	 P-	 	 P+	 P-	 	 P+	 P-	 P+	 P-	 	 P+	 P-	 P+	 P-	 P+	 P-	 P+	 P-		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	1	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.01	 0.01	 	 0.03	 0.03	 	 0.08	 0.08	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	1.1	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.13	 0.00	 	 0.16	 0.00	 	 0.43	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	1.2	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.50	 0.00	 	 0.45	 0.00	 	 0.82	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	1.3	 0.01	 0.00	 	 0.86	 0.00	 	 0.75	 0.00	 	 0.97	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.03	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.00	1.4	 0.06	 0.00	 	 0.98	 0.00	 	 0.92	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.10	 0.00	 	 0.01	 0.00	 	 0.01	 0.00	1.5	 0.22	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.98	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.26	 0.00	 	 0.03	 0.00	 	 0.03	 0.00	1.6	 0.48	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.47	 0.00	 	 0.06	 0.00	 	 0.06	 0.00	1.7	 0.31	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.68	 0.00	 	 0.12	 0.00	 	 0.12	 0.00	1.8	 0.13	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.84	 0.00	 	 0.21	 0.00	 	 0.21	 0.00	1.9	 0.04	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.93	 0.00	 	 0.33	 0.00	 	 0.33	 0.00	2	 0.01	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 		 0.97	 0.00	 		 0.45	 0.00	 		 0.45	 0.00		
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Table	A-6	Rosenbaum	bounds	analysis	for	the	JKN	Subsidised	group	(Chapter	7)			 	 Any	Outpatient	 	 #	visit	(total)	 	 #	visit	(Public)	 	 #	visit	(Private)	 Any	Inpatient	 	 #	visit	(total)	 	 #	visit	(Public)	 	 #	visit	(Private)	Gamma	 P+	 P-	 	 P+	 P-	 	 P+	 P-	 	 P+	 P-	 P+	 P-	 	 P+	 P-	 P+	 P-	 P+	 P-		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	1	 0.11	 0.11	 		 0.99	 0.99	 		 0.42	 0.42	 		 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.24	 0.24	 		 0.18	 0.18	 		 0.75	 0.75	1.1	 0.41	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.65	 	 0.92	 0.03	 	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.71	 0.02	 	 0.53	 0.03	 	 0.93	 0.44	1.2	 0.05	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.06	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.23	 0.00	 0.00	 	 0.96	 0.00	 	 0.84	 0.00	 	 0.99	 0.19	1.3	 0.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.82	 0.02	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.97	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.06	1.4	 0.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 0.99	 0.07	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.01	1.5	 0.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 1.00	 0.17	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	1.6	 0.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 1.00	 0.34	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	1.7	 0.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 1.00	 0.52	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	1.8	 0.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 1.00	 0.34	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	1.9	 0.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 1.00	 0.20	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	2	 0.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 1.00	 0.00	 	 0.00	 1.00	 0.10	 0.00	 		 1.00	 0.00	 		 1.00	 0.00	 		 1.00	 0.00	
Table	A-7	Logit	regression	table	for	JKN	participation	among	the	contributory	
group	




Variables	 Coefficient	 Standard	error	 P	-	value	 Upper	95%	CI	 Lower	95%	CI		      Sampling	weight	 0.11	 0.09	 0.19	 -0.06	 0.28	Age		 0.00	 0.01	 1.00	 -0.02	 0.02	Gender	(1	=	male)	 -0.09	 0.05	 0.10	 -0.20	 0.02	Single	 -0.24	 0.13	 0.06	 -0.50	 0.01	Married	 0.20	 0.10	 0.04	 0.01	 0.39	Urban	 0.53	 0.06	 0.00	 0.40	 0.65	Primary	education	 0.15	 0.10	 0.12	 -0.04	 0.34	Secondary	education	 -0.05	 0.11	 0.67	 -0.26	 0.17	College	education	 -0.77	 0.29	 0.01	 -1.33	 -0.21	Higher	education	 -0.78	 0.25	 0.00	 -1.26	 -0.29	Assets	index	 -0.44	 0.03	 0.00	 -0.49	 -0.39	Number	of	acute	conditions	 0.05	 0.03	 0.12	 -0.01	 0.10	Number	of	chronic	condition	 0.14	 0.13	 0.30	 -0.12	 0.40	Any	disability	 0.14	 0.26	 0.59	 -0.37	 0.66	Density	of	outpatient	care	facilities	 -0.14	 0.27	 0.61	 -0.68	 0.40	Density	of	inpatient	care	facilities	 2.78	 2.00	 0.17	 -1.15	 6.71	Recipients	of	unconditional	cash	transfer	 0.76	 0.06	 0.00	 0.65	 0.87	Assets	index	-	squared	 -0.07	 0.01	 0.00	 -0.08	 -0.05	Age-	squared	 0.00	 0.00	 0.22	 0.00	 0.00	Density	outpatient	-	squared	 0.02	 0.02	 0.18	 -0.01	 0.05	Density	inpatient	-	squared	 -1.52	 0.81	 0.06	 -3.11	 0.07	Acute	conditions	-	squared	 0.00	 0.00	 0.25	 -0.01	 0.00	Chronic	conditions	-	squared	 -0.08	 0.06	 0.19	 -0.19	 0.04	Constant	 -1.76	 0.31	 0.00	 -2.36	 -1.15			 	
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